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Discretion in Long-Term Open Quantity Contracts: Reining in Good Faith
Victor P. Goldberg
Long-term contracts often promise to deliver the seller’s full output, the buyer’s
requirements, or some variation on these. For example, an electric utility might enter into a thirty
year contract with a coal mine promising that it will take all the coal needed to supply a particular
generating plant. These open quantity contracts have raised two issues. The first has been
whether the promise was illusory. If the utility had no duty to take any coal, a court could have
found that there was no consideration and, therefore, no contract. While there was a time when
full output and requirements contracts did not fare well on this ground,1 nowadays their validity
is rarely challenged with success.2
The second and more interesting question today concerns the interpretation of the quantity
term. What, if anything, limits the buyer’s discretion? The answer, both at common law and in
UCC §2-306(1), has been “good faith.”3 The Code’s Official Comment claims that §2-306
entails “the reading of commercial background and intent into the language of any agreement.”4
In fact, it does nothing of the sort. Rather, it often involves supplanting the parties’ careful
balancing of various concerns in the initial contract with a wooden, uninformed reading of the

1

See, for example, Bailey v. Austrian 19 Minn. 535 (1873) and Crane et al. v. C. Crane &
Co., 105 F. 869 (7th Cir. 1901). American Trading Co. v. National Fiber & Insulation Co. 111 A.
290 (1920) provides an extensive list of early cases finding contracts void for want of mutuality;
that case is discussed below, at note ?. For a more inclusive listing, see Mutuality and
Enforceability of Contract to Furnish Another With His Needs, Wants, Desires, Requirements and
the Like, of Certain Commodities, 26 A.L.R. 2d 1139. See also, Havighurst & Berman,
Requirements and Output Contracts, 27 Ill. L. Rev. 1, 23-24. (1932). For a suggestion that the
judicial hostility was overstated, see See Walter F. Pratt, Jr., American Contract Law at the Turn
of the Century, 39 S.C. L. Rev. 415 (1988) and Stacy A. Silkworth, Quantity Variation in Open
Quantity Contracts, 51 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 235 (1990).
2

For one of the few successful challenges, see Propane Industrial, Inc. v. General Motors
Corporation, 429 F.Supp. 214 (1977) (discussed below at note 43).
3

§2-306(1). The UCC already imposes an implied, nonwaivable covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. So, the explicit mention of good faith in §2-306 would seem redundant. It likely
reflects the importance of “good faith” in resolving the illusory promise problem of an earlier era.
In the May 1999 proposed revision, the provision is renumbered as §2-304 with some minor
changes in wording that do not help. The American Law Institute approved the draft in May
1999. However, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
tabled it in July 1999. The Discussion Draft of April 14, 2000 restores the original number and
makes no revisions.
4

UCC §2-306, Comment 1.
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agreement. With no theory to guide them, courts have held that good faith required that
producers behave in most peculiar ways–for example, running a plant at below full capacity for
the life of the contract, or running the plant to satisfy the needs of its waste remover rather than
its customers.
This second question is the focus of the present paper (although I will give some attention
to the first as well). The paper is part of a larger project, the intent of which is to make contract
interpretation more transactionally sensitive.5 It is the most ambitious of the papers thus far, as it
examines a much broader set of cases than had its predecessors. Here, the central concern is the
allocation of discretion to one party to respond to changing circumstances and the constraints
placed on that flexibility to protect the counterparty’s reliance interest.
Long-term contracts cannot completely specify in advance all the obligations of both
parties over the life of the agreement.6 In order to adapt their relationship to changing
circumstances they will find it necessary to give one, or both, parties the discretion to respond as
new information becomes available. In particular, they might find that shifting supply and demand
conditions would be better met by giving one party the discretion to vary quantity. Suppose that
the party with discretion is the buyer, as in a requirements contract. The seller would have two
concerns. First, the buyer could use its discretion opportunistically to rewrite the contract.7
Second, if the seller intended to make decisions in reliance on the continued performance of the
buyer, it would want a means of conveying the extent of that reliance, perhaps by setting a
minimum quantity or establishing a multi-part pricing regime. In effect, it wants to confront the
buyer with a price reflecting the extent of its reliance. If that price is set too high, both parties
lose. It is in their joint interest to fine-tune the protection of the reliance; and as we shall see
below, they can be quite good at it. The generous interpretation of good faith parallels the
expansion of liability under §90 of the Restatements.8 The courts have used good faith as a blunt

5

See Victor P. Goldberg, Bloomer Girl Revisited or How to Frame an Unmade Picture,
1998 Wis. L. Rev. 1051; Victor P. Goldberg, In Search of Best Efforts: Reinterpreting Bloor v.
Falstaff, __ St. Louis University Law Journal __(2000); and Victor P. Goldberg, Economic
Reasoning and the Framing of Contract Law: Sale of an Asset of Uncertain Value, 92 Revue
d'Economie Industrielle 111 (2000).
6

Complex contracts could have more than two parties, but the contracts of concern in this
paper will be two-party contracts.
7

This is the central theme of Steven J. Burton & Eric G. Andersen, Contractual Good
Faith. “[I]n commercial cases . . . discretion in performance may not be used to recapture
opportunities foregone when contracting.” (At 127)
8

See Farnsworth on Contracts at §2.19. A recent survey of the case law suggests that the
judicial acceptance of reliance as a basis for enforcing contracts has been overstated; see Robert
A. Hillman, Questioning the “New Consensus” on Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical and
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instrument for providing protection to one party's reliance without asking whether that party
would have been willing to pay for such protection in the first place.
A contract grants one party discretion for a reason. The reason might not always be
obvious, and it might not be a very good reason, but, as in most other areas of contract law, the
courts should defer to the judgment of the parties. If it turns out that the buyer has no
requirements or the seller chooses to produce no output, so be it. Such a rule would encourage
the parties to determine at the time of contracting how they would constrain the discretion. The
invocation of good faith should be unnecessary or at worst it should be read narrowly to
recognize one exception.9 If the contract linked the buyer’s requirements to the needs of a
particular plant, sale of the plant or the firm would terminate the requirements of the buyer,
although the plant would continue to have requirements. The buyer could attempt to avoid the
consequences of a bad bargain by such an opportunistic sale. Even in these situations, parties can
(and do) contract to deal with just such behavior, so at most the exception would serve as a
default rule to protect casual or careless contractors from themselves. Ironically, the UCC does
not preclude this form of opportunism.10 As we shall see below, the courts have had difficulty
distinguishing the buyer who no longer has requirements because it had sold its plant from the
buyer who had closed the plant.11
Commentators have converged on the implications of the good faith standard for open
quantity contracts. According to Silkworth, “[c]ourts consider two related factors in deciding
these cases. First, courts will uphold quantity variations if they find a valid business reason that
justifies the variation. Second, courts will disallow a quantity variation and award damages where

Theoretical Study, 98 Columbia Law Review 580 (1998).
9

The discretion/reliance problem has traditionally been lumped with two other classes of
cases involving open quantity terms. In some contexts, quantity discretion is, in effect, an implicit
excuse clause. A grower agrees to sell its entire cotton crop before it is harvested; see, for
example, Riegel Fiber Corporation v. Anderson Gin Company, 512 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1975). Or,
relatedly, the variability might be meant to accommodate the discretion of a third party, as in
Atlantic Track and Turnout Company v. Perini Corporation 989 F.2d 541 (1st Cir. 1993). If bad
weather results in a small crop or if the third party chooses not to go forward, the promisor’s
obligation is pared back. The second class involves jobbers who purchase large quantities of
goods when the market price exceeds the contract price; see, for example, the textbook favorite,
Oscar Schlegel Manufacturing Company v. Peter Cooper's Glue Factory 231 N.Y. 459; 132 N.E.
148 (1921). These cases are analytically different and are beyond the scope of this article.
10

“When an enterprise is sold, the question may arise whether the buyer is bound by an
existing output or requirements contract. That question is outside the scope of this Article, and is
to be determined by other principles of law.” UCC §2-306, Comment 4.
11

See Section III.
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they find that the quantity determining party has attempted to manipulate the contract in light of a
contract price and market price disparity.”12 Similarly, in their treatise on Contractual Good
Faith, Burton and Andersen state: “Most cases involving the obligation to perform in good faith
can be synthesized using the following principle: a party performs in bad faith by using discretion
in performance for reasons outside the justified expectations of the parties arising from their
agreement.”13 The problem with both formulations is that they do not provide a framework for
inferring the valid business reasons (Silkworth) and reasonable expectations (Burton & Andersen)
that would define the contours of good faith. Indeed, once the analytical framework is
understood, it is clear that “good faith” does no work.
What follows is a tour through the case law with three different concerns in mind. First is
an analysis of the decisions on the merits. Second, the decisions provide some evidence on how
the parties cope with the problem of harnessing discretion. The evidence, however, is often not
very good, which leads to my third concern: The quality of the evidence is poor because the
courts ask the wrong questions and adduce the wrong evidence. The exercise will, I hope,
provide further support for framing contract law questions with more attention to the underlying
economics of the transaction. Paradoxically, while I look more deeply at the economics than the
courts have done, the moral of the exercise is that courts should look even less. With the possible
exception of the sale-of-plant cases, courts should just say Yes.
I begin by drawing upon an earlier study of mine of petroleum coke contracts14 to
illustrate the nuanced allocation of discretion regarding quantity determination. Section II
analyzes some cases involving long-term contracts in which the contract’s validity was questioned
for want of mutuality. Sections III and IV analyze contracts in which the requirements were
reduced to zero (or nearly so). The first of these focuses on the problem of the buyer transferring
the underlying asset, and the second analyzes a set of cases in which the promisor found a drastic
cutback to be the best course of action. Section V concerns contracts in which an attractive
contract price induced the buyer to increase its requirements (or a seller its output). Section VI
concludes.

I. Quantity Variation in Long Term Contracts: An Illustrative Example

12

Silkworth, note 1 at 236. See also Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts:
An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Legal Studies, 271, 298
(1992) and Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 997, 1070.
13

Burton & Andersen, note 7, at 57.

14

Victor P. Goldberg and John Erickson, Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term
Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke, 30 J. of Law & Econ. 369 (1987).
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To facilitate adaptation to changed circumstances, long-term contracts typically allow one
party some discretion regarding quantity, requirements and output contracts being extreme forms.
Even in these, the discretion will not be unbounded. One limitation on discretion is physical. A
contract, for example, would not require the seller to provide whatever quantity of widgets the
buyer desires. Rather the seller would commit to providing widgets the buyer needs for a
particular purpose or to supply a particular plant. The capacity of the buyer's plant would place
an outer limit on the buyer's discretion. There are numerous devices for constraining discretion.
The contract could set up a mechanism, requiring, for example, that changes be ratified by both
parties. Or it could give one party the power to determine output, confronting that party with a
cost if it were to change the quantity in a way that would affect adversely the counterparty. If Y
is the party with discretion, other things equal, the greater X’s reliance, the greater the price Y
must pay for quantity adjustments adversely affecting X. The law, as currently embodied in §2306(2), provides a set of default rules and barriers to surmounting them. The Code exhibits a lack
of faith in the ability of the contracting parties to fine-tune the protection of the counterparty’s
reliance. In fact, their ability to fine-tune is quite impressive, much better, I would assert, than
courts invoking good faith after the fact. In this Section, I will illustrate how the relianceflexibility tradeoff varies with the context, analyzing quantity variation in contracts for a particular
product—petroleum coke in a particular period (pre-1970).15
Petroleum coking is a process that takes the heavy residual oils left over from the initial
distillation of crude oil, producing gas oil (which can be further processed into lighter, higher
valued, fuels like gasoline) and petroleum coke. In 1970 there were 53 cokers in operation at
refineries in the United States. About 15% of the crude oil refined in the United States was
coked. The coke was a waste product of the refining process, bulky and a source of pollution.
However, it had some value, particularly to the aluminum industry. Calcining the coke made it an
excellent conductor of electricity and the calcined coke was used to make anodes for the
electrolytic cell reduction of alumina to aluminum. Its value in this use was enough so that
owners of calciners were willing to pay the refineries a positive price to take the coke off their
hands.16
Great Lakes Carbon Corporation (GLC) owned a dozen calciners, selling the calcined
coke to end users. GLC had storage capacity at ten different locations which could hold about an
eighteen month supply of raw coke. In the late 1950's end users, primarily aluminum companies,
began building their own calciners. Most, but not all, the aluminum companies’ output was for
internal use; some, however, was sold to other end users. These calciners were, for the most part,
built in conjunction with new cokers.

15

This Section is based on Goldberg and Erickson (note 14).

16

Only high quality (low sulphur) coke was calcined. Low quality (high sulphur) coke also
usually sold at a positive price, albeit a much lower one. It was used primarily for fuel in utility
boilers and cement kilns.
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The contracts between the refineries (cokers) and the calciners varied considerably in the
way they allocated responsibility for the quantity decision, the variation reflecting the concerns of
the parties. When, for example, a refinery added a new coker, it wanted some assurance that the
accumulation of coke would not unreasonably interfere with the operation of the refinery. But
assurance is costly, so the refinery would have to weigh the benefits of additional assurance
against the costs. For the GLC contracts this weighing generally resulted in granting the coker
complete discretion to produce any quantity of coke (including zero). However, the results were
dramatically different for the end user contracts.
GLC entered into ten long-term contracts with refineries building new cokers in 194661. The cokers’ capacity was less than that of GLC’s calciners which, typically, were supplied
by half a dozen or more cokers. The refineries had little storage capacity, so if the coke were not
removed promptly, the refinery might have to shut down its coking (and perhaps its refining)
operation entirely. GLC, on the other hand, had considerable storage capacity so that it could
immediately remove coke from the refinery and store it rather than processing it immediately. Its
ample storage capacity enabled GLC to adapt with ease to fluctuations in the quantity of coke
produced at individual refineries. As a result, almost all the GLC contracts were full
output/immediate removal contracts with GLC bearing all the risks of quantity variation. The
coker was obligated to sell only if it produced, but the decision as to whether it should produce
(and if so, how much) was entirely in the hands of the refinery. A failure to remove the coke
rapidly enough would constitute a breach of GLC’s obligations.
17

It is tempting to claim that this allocation of discretion is obvious. The seller is, in effect,
contracting for removal of a waste product, one accounting for less than three percent of the
value of the refinery’s product; it seems logical that its production decisions would be based on
the market for its product, not for its waste. Examination of the contracts with the aluminum
companies shows that this is too simple. The aluminum contracts concerned the simultaneous
construction of a new coker and new calciner. The calciners were located near the cokers, often
sharing the inventory pile. Unlike GLC, the aluminum companies could not rely on multiple
sources (including inventories) of coke. They were dependent upon a particular refinery, just as
the refineries were dependent on them for removing coke. In none of the contracts did the buyer
promise to take all the coker’s output. Nor did the contracts go to the opposite extreme by
obligating the cokers to meet the calciner’s requirements. Rather the contracts specified a
minimum quantity, granted the buyer (calciner) some discretion in varying that quantity (up or
down), and provided some mechanism to convey to the calciner the extent of the coker’s reliance.
Thus did the parties fine-tune the protection of their respective reliance interests.
The contracts accomplished this in different ways. In one instance the buyer agreed to pay
a “standby” charge of $75,000 per month, which obligated it to pay for about 40% of the coke,

17

Nine of the ten were for at least ten years.
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whether it took any or not. In effect, if not in name, this amounted to a “take-or-pay” clause.18 In
other contracts, the price per ton was higher for the first, say, 35% of the contract quantity than
for the remainder. The low marginal price encouraged the buyer to take more, thereby giving
some protection to the seller’s reliance. One contract allowed the buyer to reduce its take if there
were external evidence of a decline in the demand for its aluminum, the reduction being shared by
the parties by formula. The buyer in that contract did, however, agree to pay fifty percent of the
contract price whether or not any coke was produced (take-or-pay, again). While the mechanism
varied, the basic format was the same. The calciner determined the quantity, but the coker’s
interest was conveyed by confronting the calciner with a cost if it were to take less than the
contract quantity.
Two contracts between Union Oil and Collier illustrate how the availability of storage
capacity could influence the allocation of decision making with regard to quantity. Both were for
the construction of an adjacent coker and calciner. Both were for full output and gave the
refinery the option of suspending, reducing, or discontinuing the production of coke. The storage
capacity at the two sites differed considerably, however, with one having a two-year capacity,
while the other was able to store less than six months production of coke,. At the former, the
stockpile was the calciner’s only protection from supply disruptions. It bore the risk that in the
early years Union Oil would not find it worth its while to produce enough coke to maintain the
inventory stockpile. The latter contract gave the buyer more assurance of continued supply and
also provided less assurance of removal. The contract called for a minimum quantity over the ten
year life of the agreement of roughly forty percent of the coker’s capacity. If the seller
discontinued producing coke, it agreed to make up the deficiency with coke of similar quality
from other sources at the contract price. If the coke at the refinery accumulated beyond a certain
point and Union desired to continue coking, it could solicit outside offers. Collier had a right of
first refusal. If there were no outside offers, then Union could force Collier to remove the coke;
however, Collier would only have to pay fifty percent of the contract price. Thus, when deciding
whether to produce additional coke, Union had some incentive to take into account the buyer’s
difficulties of disposal.
So, although the contracts were all for the same product, petroleum coke, the allocation of
discretion was dictated by the context. Where the calciners had ample storage capacity, the
quantity decision was in the hands of the cokers (the pure full output contracts). Where calciners
had little storage capacity and alternative suppliers were problematic, the cokers relinquished their
discretion, giving the calciner the final say. However, none of the agreements gave the buyer
unbridled discretion (as would a requirements contract). The calciner’s freedom to alter the
quantity taken was typically circumscribed to take into account the coker’s reliance. Of course,
the law, by reading good faith into the contract, would have placed some limits on the buyer’s
discretion under a requirements contract. The negotiated limits on buyer discretion were different
from, and far more nuanced than, those arising from the good faith standard.
18

Take-or-pay clauses are misnamed. The buyer agrees to pay for a fixed quantity
regardless of whether he in fact takes it.
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II. Mutuality
Economic actors often attempt to arrange their affairs so that there is no enforceable
promise. For example, early automobile franchise agreements were held unenforceable for want
of mutuality. The auto manufacturers could have redrafted to resolve the technical problem but
chose not to do so since they preferred that their arrangements be terminable at will.19 It is
important to remember that one, or both, parties will often desire that their relationship not be
treated as an enforceable contract, although it is doubtful that constructing the relationship so that
a court would find a lack of mutuality is a sensible way to achieve that goal.
Mutuality is often invoked strategically by a party who was quite content to have the
contract enforceable at the time of formation, but was looking for a rationale for not performing
when things turned out not to her liking. Such opportunistic challenges against long-term
contracts on the ground that mutuality is lacking seldom succeed anymore.20 For an egregious
(and venerable) example of a court validating such an opportunistic ploy, consider Northern Iowa
Gas & Electric Co. v. Incorporated Town of Luverne, Iowa.21 A power company entered into a
twenty-year contract to provide electricity in an amount “to answer the needs of the town and its
said patrons” with the town having the option to renew for an additional twenty year term. The
town would build, maintain, and own transmission lines from a connecting point to the town. The
contract explicitly recognized the town’s reliance: “It is further understood that the town is about
to expend approximately $11,000 in order to secure electric lights and power for its use and for
the use of its citizens and patrons, and that it does and must rely upon the company . . . to provide
such electricity; and the company therefore agrees that it will furnish the town a good and
sufficient bond in the sum of $5,000, upon which the company and a solvent surety company shall
at all times be liable, conditioned for the faithful performance of this contract, and for the payment
of any damages, stipulated or otherwise, which the town may suffer by reason of a breach in

19

See Bushwick-Decatur Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor co. 116 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1940).
Friedrich Kessler, Automobile Dealer Franchises: Vertical Integration by Contract 66 Yale Law
Journal 1135, 1149 (1957), noted:
An initial block confronting dealers lay in the argument that a franchise, marked by
the absence or indefiniteness of obligations, was not a valid and enforceable
contract. Until recently, the validity issue was continuously raised in franchise
litigation, the defendant manufacturer almost invariably arguing that the agreement
lacked mutuality. . . .
For many decades, the invalidity argument may have been the most powerful
weapon available to manufacturers in defending damage suits by dealers. It was
honored by most courts, provided the manufacturer engaged in careful
draftsmanship.
20

Farnsworth on Contracts, §3.2.

21

257 F. 818 (1919).
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whole or in part of any of the conditions of this agreement.”22 The contract price was 3.5¢ per
kilowatt hour (the opinion is unclear as to whether this would have been fixed in nominal terms
for the entire forty years). As a result of the First World War, the price was “confiscatory,” and
the power company wanted out. It sought an injunction restraining the town from connecting to
its transmission lines. And the court granted it: “As the [town] under the contract in question
never assumed any obligation on its part, nor agreed to purchase any definite amount of electricity
for lighting or other purposes, the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant is lacking in
mutuality, and therefore void.”23
The decision is an aberration even in its day. Most courts would have been capable of
overcoming the court’s lack-of-mutuality argument. Surely, the parties thought they had a
contract. The court does not say whether the power company did indeed furnish the $5,000
bond, but it is reasonable to presume that it did so. According to the court, the power company
furnished a bond against the breach of a non-contract and was kind enough to grant an option to
renew the non-contract. It does not require a very fertile imagination to find ample consideration
in the town’s promise to build and maintain the transmission line; nor should the uncertain
quantity create a problem. Demand projections for electricity twenty (or forty) years down the
road will be highly uncertain, especially in the early days of electrification. That sort of
uncertainty is precisely why both parties would opt for a variable quantity contract.
The decision provides an illustration both of how a court’s framing of the issue can lead to
foolish results (although this court seemed more intent than necessary on winding up in the wrong
place), and of how parties can tailor their protection of reliance to their needs. The power
company has numerous customers, the town only one (most likely) supplier. The power company
could have insisted upon a minimum payment, but apparently did not do so. The town would
have to spend some money to prepare to receive the electricity and insisted upon some protection
against the seller’s failure to meet its needs. The $5,000 bond seems relatively modest given the
initial expenditure, but since the town would bear the cost of a larger bond indirectly, the
magnitude reflects a judgment as to how much protection its reliance warranted.
The court came to a very different result in Van Horn et al v. Ericson Lake Co. et al.24
Ericson (the company) built a dam and agreed to provide to Ericson (the town) all the electric
power needs of its residents for fifteen years. It built the dam and the transmission lines, and
performed under the contract for some period of time. High water washed away the dam and the
company was unable to rebuild. Indeed, its property was sold after the mortgage had been
foreclosed. The town’s reliance was such that it had required that the company post a bond.
Moreover, there was no force majeure clause; if an act of God washed away the dam, the

22

At 819.

23

At 822.

24

203 N.W. 553, 113 Neb. 332 (1925).
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company was still responsible. The court rejected without comment the lack-of-mutuality
defense. It concluded that the bond was for liquidated damages, not a penalty, and enforced the
contract against the surety.
In the remainder of this Section I will discuss three relatively recent cases in which a
disappointed party attempted to avoid a contract by invoking the lack of mutuality.25 All three
disputes followed fuel price increases in the early 1970's, although the first, Laclede Gas
Company v. Amoco Oil Company,26 preceded the October 1973 oil shock.
Laclede was a distributor of natural gas and propane. The developers of new residential
developments would negotiate with Laclede to provide an assured supply of gas or propane. In
the long run, the efficient fuel would be gas, but because the capital costs of connecting to a gas
distribution system were likely high and the delays long, propane served as the interim fuel of
choice. Amoco agreed to supply Laclede with all its propane requirements for specific
developments at a price 4¢ per gallon above the price posted at Amoco’s refinery. A developer
would first request that Laclede supply it. If Laclede determined that provision would be
appropriate, then it could request that Amoco agree to supply the propane to that development.
If Amoco agreed to do so, it would sign a supplemental form to this effect. So, Laclede had the
responsibility for recommending that a development be served, but Amoco reserved the right to
refuse. Once it had agreed, however, it was obligated to provide the development’s propane
requirements.

25

See also Portland Gasoline Co. v. Superior Mktg. Co. Inc, 150 Tex. 533, 243 S.W.2d
823 (1951). Portland promised to deliver to Superior “all of the net butane and propane mixture
that it produces.” Superior wanted out of the contract for reasons unstated. One clause of the
contract provided that, although the parties expected the daily production to exceed 10,000
gallons, Portland would not be in default if it delivered less than that amount so long as what it
delivered was its total production. Superior argued that because Portland could cease production
entirely and thereby avoid any obligation, the contract was illusory. Rejecting this argument, the
court held that the implied promise to manufacture and deliver was sufficient to provide
mutuality. The Texas Supreme Court has subsequently held that it was not necessary to rely on
the implied promise to find the existence of a contract “and to the extent Portland Gasoline found
that such an implied obligation was necessary for the contract to be enforceable, we overrule it.”
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 986 S.W.2d 603, 36 U.C.C. Rep.Serv.2d 1011, 42
Tex. Sup. J. 75 (1997).
26

385 F.Supp. 1332 (1974) district court; reversed and remanded, 522 F.2d 33, 8th Cir
(1975). I will consider two other pre-oil shock cases in Section V: City of Lakeland, Florida v.
Union Oil Company of California 352 F.Supp. 758 (1973); and Orange and Rockland Utilities,
Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corporation 59 A.D.2d 110; 397 N.Y.S.2d 814; 96 A.L.R.3d 1263; 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 310 (1977).
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Laclede was to install, maintain, and operate all distribution facilities from the point of
delivery, Amoco’s header piping. It appears from the court’s description that Laclede would have
to make some investment in storage equipment and other facilities in attaching to Amoco’s
distribution lines.27 Substitution of other suppliers would therefore be expensive. The Court of
Appeals probably overstated Laclede’s vulnerability:
Laclede thus bound itself to buy all its requirements from Amoco by agreeing to
attach its distribution lines to Amoco's header piping; and even if a change of
suppliers could be made under the contract, Laclede could not own and operate a
separate distribution system hooked up to some other supplier's propane storage
tanks without substantially altering the supply route to its distribution system or
making a very substantial investment in its own storage equipment and site. As a
practical matter, then, Laclede is bound to buy all the propane it distributes from
Amoco in any subdivision to which the supplemental agreement applies and for
which the distribution system has been established.28
The investments could not have been too onerous since they were meant to be transitional. In the
three years the parties operated under the agreement, seventeen developments were signed up, but
only eight remained. (All eight were mobile home parks.) The flexibility afforded Laclede
(discussed below) is another indicator of the modest level of relation-specific investment.
Moreover, while the parties were in dispute, Laclede began supplying the subdivisions by truck
with propane from Phillips procured under a separate supply contract.29 Laclede’s contract with
Phillips allowed it to buy up to 45 million gallons of propane annually. The maximum amount of
propane it purchased for the subdivisions was 400,000 gallons, less than one percent of the

27

The trial court suggested that both parties had to make some relation-specific
investments:
It was Amoco's obligation, upon acceptance of a subdivision by this supplemental
letter agreement, to acquire the sites suitable to both parties for the location of the
required storage and vaporization facilities. Amoco was to install, own, maintain
and operate those and any other facilities necessary and 'adequate to provide a
continuous supply' of propane, which included the delivery of propane into the
storage tanks in volumes sufficient to meet the needs of the customers within the
subdivision. Laclede was obliged to acquire easements and other rights at the
installation of its distribution facilities, and to install, own, maintain and operate
said distribution facilities within the subdivision. The title to the gas would pass
from Amoco to Laclede at the outlet of the Amoco header piping. (At 1334)
28

522 F.2d 33 at 38.
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385 F.Supp. 1332, 1334.
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Phillips’ contract.30 So, while it could easily meet the demands of the subdivisions by general
purchases of propane and delivering it to its own storage tanks by truck, the agreement allowed it
to save money by putting in some relation-specific investment and eliminating the costs of truck
distribution.
The agreement allowed Laclede to fine-tune protection for its reliance. If Amoco
accepted a particular subdivision, it was required to meet that subdivision’s propane needs for life.
It could not terminate the agreement. Both parties expected, however, that the systems would
eventually be converted to natural gas. Upon conversion, Laclede would give Amoco thirty days
written notice and that would terminate its responsibility to the subdivision. In addition, Laclede
had the right to terminate each year even if the subdivision continued to use propane.31 Amoco
had no right to terminate. Laclede could, therefore, rely on Amoco’s continued supply; however,
its right to terminate allowed it to substitute fuel from an alternative supplier if the contract price
became so far out of line with the market price that it would pay to replace Amoco with truckedin propane (or to construct alternative distribution facilities for piped-in propane). Amoco, with a
large number of customers and little relation-specific investment needed no protection and was
therefore willing to forego the right to terminate, especially since the contract price was indexed
to the price it would be charging others (the posted price).
Nonetheless, a conflict arose when Amoco notified Laclede of a 3¢ per gallon increase in
April 1973. Laclede objected and demanded an explanation. Amoco refused to give one, instead
sending a letter informing Laclede that it was terminating the agreement and that it had a right to
do so since the agreement lacked mutuality.
The trial judge agreed with Amoco. Laclede’s right to cancel arbitrarily without Amoco
having a similar right made the agreement void for lack of mutuality. The consideration was “not
of sufficient quality nor quantity to act as a palliative for Amoco to swallow the bitter pill of
Laclede’s arbitrary and unbridled right of cancellation.”32 The Court of Appeals reversed, citing
Corbin for the notion that so long as Laclede could only exercise the power to cancel with notice,
the contract should not be rendered invalid for lack of consideration. The contract was a
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At 1335.
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“This Agreement shall remain in effect for one (1) year following the first delivery of gas
by (Amoco) to (Laclede) hereunder. . . . this Agreement shall automatically continue in effect for
additional periods of one (1) year each unless (Laclede) shall, not less than 30 days prior to the
expiration of the initial one (1) year period or any subsequent one (1) year period, give (Amoco)
written notice of termination.” 522 F.2d 33, at 36.
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requirements contract and such contracts are routinely enforced where “the needs of the
purchaser are reasonably foreseeable and the time of performance is reasonably limited.”33
The notice rationale, which is widely accepted, is really quite bizarre. Navigating the
somewhat tricky terrain of the doctrine of consideration, Corbin forwarded this distinction which
is now standard doctrine:
(1) A promises to pay $100 a week for service and B promises to serve for one
year beginning June 1 if he then so pleases. There is no contract; B’s promise is no
promise. The same is true if B promises “I promise to serve for one year beginning
June 1, but I reserve the privilege of not serving.”
(2) Is the case materially different if B’s promise is, “I promise to serve for one
year beginning June 1, but I reserve the option to cancel by giving notice before
that date”? Both technically and practically there is a difference, because the terms
of B’s promise no longer leave his option unlimited. His option is between serving
and giving notice, and not as in the first case above between serving and not
serving. The cost to B of one of these alternatives—the giving of notice—may be
slight. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of a consideration if
agreed upon as such. The writing and the mailing of a letter is more than a
peppercorn.34
So, and the treatises agree, a slight constraint on the promisor’s right to cancel would constitute
sufficient legal detriment to provide consideration.35 In effect, instead of paying $0 for the option
(not enforceable), or a nominal amount (perhaps not enforceable because the payment is a
sham),36 the promisor agrees to make a contingent payment of 33 ¢ (the price of a postage stamp)
to a third party—the Post Office (enforceable).37 Rather artificial.
The district court was bothered by the lack of symmetry in the termination mechanism.
Such asymmetries are to be expected and are a natural consequence of the underlying purpose of

33

522 F.2d 33, 38.

34

Arthur L. Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration, 34 Yale L. J. 571, 587-588

(1925).
35

Laclede (at 37) cites both Williston and Corbin for the proposition. See Farnsworth on
Contracts at §2.14, n.3.
36

See Farnsworth on Contracts at §2.11, §3.23.

37

If the promisor terminates with notice, the damages would be the same as for the $0
option, namely zero. If the promisor neglected to give notice, however, the damages could be
substantial.
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the transaction. Laclede has the right to propose the connection of a particular subdivision;
Amoco has the right to veto it. But once Amoco chooses not to exercise the veto, the decision
on whether service should continue is put exclusively in Laclede’s hands since Laclede has some
relation-specific investment at risk and because Laclede must determine when the transition to gas
should be made. The agreement reflects a plausible allocation of decision rights between the
parties. It is not the only plausible allocation; one could imagine situations in which Amoco
would insist upon more protection of its reliance. Still, the value both parties anticipated from
entering into the deal stemmed from the carefully structured allocation of decision rights, not from
the fact that Laclede had to give notice.
In Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corporation,38 a glitch in the price index resulted in
the contract price of aviation fuel being substantially below the market price. The contract was a
straightforward requirements contract with Gulf agreeing to sell all of Eastern's requirements of
jet fuel at specified locations. Eastern had been buying jet fuel from Gulf under similar contracts
for over a decade (and non-jet fuel for years before that). Indeed, the court suggests that the
contract was in most respects similar to contracts in general use in the business.39 Eastern
purchased 100% of its requirements at particular locations, but only about ten percent of its total
jet fuel requirements, from Gulf under this contract. The contract price was indexed to a posted
price quoted in Platt's Oilgram, but after the 1973 oil shock, the index failed to track the market
price of oil. Platt's reflected the regulated price of domestic oil, not the unregulated price of
foreign oil; by January 1974 the former was $5 per barrel while the latter had soared to $11. The
seller attempted to avoid the consequences by arguing that commercial impracticability warranted
excusing performance, that the contract was not binding for want of mutuality, and that, even if it
were binding, the buyer had breached the contract by unreasonably varying its demands. The
court rejected all three defenses.
The impracticability issue is beyond the scope of this paper, although the court was surely
right in rejecting the claim.40 The court had little trouble with the mutuality defense, noting that
under the UCC Eastern’s discretion was limited by good faith. It could not, in good faith, cut its
requirements to zero, so the contract was binding. And, finally, Eastern’s actual performance
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415 F.Supp. 429 (1975).
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“The contract is Gulf's standard form aviation fuel contract and is identical in all material
particulars with the first contract for jet fuel, dated 1959, between Eastern and Gulf and, indeed,
with aviation fuel contracts antedating the jet age. It is similar to contracts in general use in the
aviation fuel trade. The contract was drafted by Gulf after substantial arm's length negotiation
between the parties.” (At 432).
40

See, Victor P. Goldberg, Impossibility and Related Excuses, 144 J. of Inst. and
Theoretical Economics 100 (1988); and Victor P. Goldberg, Price Adjustment in Long-Term
Contracts,1985 Wis. L. Rev., 527, 543.
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under the contract was consistent with the good faith standard. It did not substantially increase its
requirements to take advantage of the favorable contract price.
The court says little about why the parties (and apparently most other buyers and sellers of
jet fuel) used a requirements contract. The only reference was to Gulf finding an outlet for jet fuel
coming from a newly completed refinery. That cannot be right. The claim that requirements
contracts were widely used by other refineries and were used by Gulf at other refineries and at
earlier times is inconsistent with this explanation. More likely, airlines were concerned with
maintaining an adequate inventory at various locations and refineries were better able to hold that
inventory and adapt to fluctuations in local demand. The court provided a cataloging of reasons
why fuel liftings at any particular location might vary either because of external factors or business
decisions by the buyer:
Throughout the history of commercial aviation, including 30 years of dealing
between Gulf and Eastern, airlines' liftings of fuel by nature have been subject to
substantial daily, weekly, monthly and seasonal variations, as they are affected by
weather, schedule changes, size of aircraft, aircraft load, local airport conditions,
ground time, availability of fueling facilities, whether the flight is on time or late,
passenger convenience, economy and efficiency of operation, fuel taxes, into-plane
fuel service charges, fuel price, and, ultimately, the judgment of the flight captain
as to how much fuel he wants to take.41
Gulf claimed that Eastern had manipulated its requirements by engaging in a practice
referred to as "fuel freighting." Eastern could vary its requirements in response to contract versus
market price differentials by filling up at the low-priced airports. Fuel freighting was, the court
argued, an established industry practice, well-known to both parties. The parties had agreed, in
effect, that Eastern would be able to respond to changed circumstances to economize on its fuel
costs. The court suggested that the opportunities for freighting were very few, but did not say
whether the practical limits on Eastern's discretion were critical to resolving the breach question.
It does not seem to matter to the court that the opportunities for fuel freighting might be much
greater than in the past three decades because of the unprecedented contract-market price
differential. Of course, if most of the remainder of Eastern's fuel supply was procured under
similar contracts with a similar indexing failure, there would be little incentive to engage in fuel
freighting. On that fact the opinion is silent.
Despite a huge contract-market price differential, the variation in quantity appears to have
been rather modest. That does not mean that Eastern did not try to take advantage of the relative
price shift; most likely its response was limited by technological realities. The court relied upon
the practical limits to fuel freighting in finding that Eastern’s behavior was acceptable under the
unreasonably disproportionate standard of §2-306. The technological limits on quantity variation
are hardly inevitable, however. Contracting parties might rationally choose to allow one party
41

415 F.Supp. 429, 436.
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considerable leeway in adapting to relative price changes even if that would result in huge swings
in requirements.42 The Eastern outcome is surely correct, but if the requirements were indeed
sensitive to relative prices, then the parties, not the court, were in the best position to determine
whether to interpose limits on Eastern’s discretion.
In Propane Industrial, Inc. v. General Motors Corporation43 the court did actually find a
contract void for want of mutuality when the buyer’s requirements were very sensitive to relative
prices (up to a quantity ceiling). General Motors’ assembly plant in Kansas City used natural gas
for heating during the winter. However, it had an interruptible contract with the public utility, the
Gas Service Company. In such a contract, the buyer gets a reduced unit price, but agrees that the
utility can interrupt supply from time to time. This variable quantity contract (not the subject of
the dispute) allows the utility to adjust to demand surges and temporary supply shortages by
allocating the risks to a particular subset of customers. General Motors was willing to accept the
risk of supply interruptions because it maintained a standby supply of propane gas at the plant. It
contracted with various propane companies to assure supplies of the standby propane. The
disputed contract was with one of these suppliers and covered the 1973-74 heating season. In the
previous year there had been three suppliers (including Propane Industrial); in 1973-74 there were
two.
The Propane Industrial contract was on a General Motors purchase order. General
Motors agreed to pay 17¢ per gallon for up to 500,000 gallons:
To cover a possible requirement of (500,000) gallons of propane to be used as
standby fuel at this Plant during the Heating Season from September 1, 1973
through April 30, 1974. . . . By the acceptance and acknowledgment of this
Purchase Order, Vendor guarantees standby propane availability of the above
quantity during the heating season to be delivered in accordance with [maximum
deliveries for month, week, and day].44
It was the backup standby contract for most of the period. GM’s other contract was with
Enterprise Products Company for propane requirements from November 1, 1973 through March
31, 1974. GM agreed to “purchase 1,600,000 gallons at $0.15463 per gallon, with an option to
be relieved of the obligation to purchase by payment of $0.035 per gallon or to delay delivery
until the 1974-1975 heating season by payment of an additional $0.045 per gallon, plus freight
charges.”45 Thus, if GM took less than the contract quantity, Enterprise would be paid 3.5¢ per
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429 F. Supp. 214 (1977).
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At 216.
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At 217.
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gallon and an extra penny if GM carried the obligation over to the next heating season. PI would
be paid nothing for standing ready to deliver propane on 24 hour notice.
So, PI was to be the exclusive supplier for the cusp months and Enterprise the primary
supplier in the peak months. The Propane Industrial contract did not, however, state how many
firms might be standby providers. Conceivably, after receipt of the PI purchase order, GM could
have entered into additional agreements with others, perhaps at more favorable prices.
It is important to recognize, as the court did not, that the contract in dispute was only one
piece of a larger package. General Motors wanted an assured supply of fuel for heating for the
winter months. It could have obtained all its fuel from a single supplier—the gas company—if it
were willing to pay the price. But it could do better by patching together a set of flexible
agreements which assured it a lower net price. The primary contract with the gas company gave
the seller the discretion to cut off supplies under certain conditions. Its secondary contract with
Enterprise was for a fixed quantity. However, GM could reduce the quantity if it wanted to and
was willing to pay a per unit fee. In effect, it promised to pay a flat fee (3.5 cents per gallon) for
the option to take up to 1.6 million gallons of propane in the peak months at a fixed price of
roughly 12 cents46 and had the option to pay an additional penny per gallon to carry over untaken
propane to the next heating season. This could be recharacterized as a take-or-pay contract with
a make-up clause in which GM agreed to pay for about 22% of the contract amount regardless of
whether or not it took anything. The tertiary contract with PI provided additional assurance at a
price premium, but gave GM complete discretion as to whether it would use PI’s propane or
someone else’s. GM did not foreclose its ability to search for lower prices; if the market price had
fallen, GM could have gone elsewhere or insisted that PI revise the agreement.
It could have achieved almost the same thing by promising that it would buy propane from
no one other than PI and Enterprise and by giving PI a right of first refusal vis a vis other
potential propane suppliers. Such an arrangement would likely be less attractive to GM since the
first refusal right discourages bidding by outsiders and would limit GM’s flexibility by forcing
subsequent bids into the same form as the PI agreement. For example, GM might be willing to
entertain an offer to supply propane for September only, but that would be precluded by a first
refusal clause. The arrangement also gave it the flexibility to respond to a price increase. If
circumstances changed so that it appeared that prices would be higher in the following heating
year, GM could increase its take of the PI propane up to the ceiling and roll the Enterprise
propane over to the next year.
Propane prices began rising in mid-1973 and PI wrote that it would be unable to fulfill the
contract unless the price were increased. The dispute is complicated by the fact that the federal
government instituted a mandatory Propane Allocation Program in October 1973. The essential
element is that, at the request of the Federal Energy Administration, Propane Industrial delivered
46
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75,000 gallons to GM’s Fairfax plant at the very end of 1973. GM paid at the contract price of
17¢. Propane Industrial billed at 40.5¢ per gallon47 and sued for the difference. If the delivery
had been made under an existing contract, General Motors would win; if not, then the federal
statute provided that the price be a reasonable price at the time of delivery and GM conceded that
the price billed by the plaintiff would be reasonable.
The question, according to the court, was whether the buyer had promised to purchase
exclusively from the seller and it concluded that it had not.
Plaintiff could not expect defendant to purchase any propane from it during the
1973-1974 season if defendant obtained more favorable terms under purchase
orders with other suppliers. Stated conversely, the plaintiff could not have
enforced against defendant an obligation to purchase from plaintiff all propane
required by defendant at its Fairfax plant during the 1973-1974 season.
Therefore, it is concluded that defendant made no express or implied
promise to purchase any propane from plaintiff during the 1973-1974 season. In
the absence of such a promise, [the] purchase order . . . lacks the mutuality of
obligations and consideration required for a binding requirements contract because
defendant gave no consideration and incurred no legal detriment in exchange for
the promise of plaintiff. The purchase order constituted merely an offer or
invitation for orders which could be revoked by plaintiff at any time prior to
acceptance by receipt of an order for a specific amount from defendant.48
If the court posed the proper question, then its answer is surely correct. GM had not
bound itself to do anything at all. It could take its propane requirements from Enterprise or
anybody else and not breach its promise. But, so what? PI had granted GM an option at a price
of zero. This was not a gift. PI did it because doing so was valuable, ex ante. Having a standby
supply contract in place meant that there was a reasonable probability that it would sell propane to
GM; the contract price appeared to reflect the risks of holding inventory, since it was ten per cent
higher than Enterprise’s full price and forty percent over its incremental price. There was a
bargain and each side received a benefit. That GM’s discretion on the downside was unbounded
should be irrelevant. The deal was valuable to PI, at least ex ante, not because of General
Motors’ good faith, but because of GM’s self-interest.
The Propane Industrial decision is one of the rare modern cases in which the lack-ofmutuality defense has succeeded. The more significant cases today concern the interpretation of
variable quantity agreements. The case law has distinguished between cases in which there has
been a significant decrease in requirements and those in which there has been a significant
increase. In the former category, it has lumped together cases in which a firm ceased to have
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requirements because it shut down a facility and those in which it ceased to have requirements
because it sold the facility to someone else who continued to operate it. In the following Section,
I begin the discussion of the interpretation issue by disaggregating the former category.
III. Zero Requirements Because of Transfer
If the buyer in a requirements contract has no requirements, it should, the UCC
notwithstanding, not be liable and an inquiry into the buyer’s good faith should be irrelevant.
There is one plausible exception to this rule. The basic problem is simple enough. X agrees to
provide Y’s requirements at a particular plant. Y then sells, leases, or otherwise disposes of the
plant to Z who continues to run the plant. Y claims to have no requirements and Z says it is not
bound by Y’s contract.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century both English and American courts allowed
that a requirements contract could be undone by a change of control. In Drake v. Vorse,49 the
defendant in a requirements contract ceased doing business as an individual and entered into a
partnership. The court held that he was under no obligation as an individual to take any more
castings since he needed none for his business as an individual. Nor did the partnership have an
obligation to take since it was not a party to the contract.50 Similarly, in Rhodes v. Forwood,51
Lord Cairns noted that a buyer could take zero requirements if the principal's colliery closed on
account of low prices, strikes, etc..
. . . if . . . it could not be contended that there is any provision in this contract
against any of those risks, why is it to be assumed with regard to the . . . risk of
the colliery owner, not selling his coal elsewhere piecemeal but selling the colliery
itself to a purchaser, that there is an implied undertaking against that one risk,
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3 N. W. 465. 52 Iowa, 417 (1879). For a more recent case holding that if a contract did
not preclude the buyer from selling his business, then the sale would effectively eliminate his duty
to have requirements, see Langenberg v. Guy, 77 Cal. App. 664; 247 P. 621; 1926 Cal. App.
LEXIS 433.
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"But, conceding that it [the contract] bound him [the defendant] to order and take of the
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although it is admitted that there is no undertaking at all against any of the other
risks? . . . The simple point here appears to me to be, as it is admitted that there is
no express contract which has been violated, can your Lordships say that there is
any implied contract which has been violated? I can find none. I cannot find any
implied contract that the colliery owner would not sell his colliery entire.52
An ALR annotation circa 1920 suggested that the application of the rule was symmetrical:
“. . . where the buyer disposes of the business with reference to which he has purchased a
commodity to the extent of his requirements, the seller is under no obligation to furnish such
commodity to the purchaser of the business, nor is he under any obligation to furnish the same to
the original buyer.”53
These decisions can be contrasted with another nineteenth century case, Wells v.
Alexandre.54 There, the seller agreed to furnish all the buyer’s coal requirements for three
steamships for one year. It did so for six months, whereupon the buyer sold the steamships,
which continued to ply the same route for the remainder of the year. The new owners apparently
purchased their coal elsewhere (the decision is vague on this) and the coal supplier sued the
original owner.55 The court held for the plaintiff:
The fact that the defendants deemed it best to sell the steamers, cannot be
permitted to operate to relieve them from the obligation to take the coal which the
ordinary and accustomed use of the steamers required, for the provisions of the
agreement do not admit of a construction that it was to terminate in the event of a
sale or other disposition of them by the defendants.56
In effect, the court hints at what appears to be a sensible default rule: the obligation is not
terminated by transfer of the property. Whether that really is an appropriate rule has nothing to
do with variable quantity contract questions. In any event, as we shall see, parties can, and do,
contract on this question. The significant point is that one can easily distinguish between the
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At 401. See also Hamlyn & Co. v. Wood & Co. [1891], 2 Q. B. 488. Defendant, a
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It sold the business to another brewer who refused to adopt the contract. The court refused to
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buyer who has no requirements because it had transferred the business to a successor (which does
still have requirements) and the buyer who simply closes down its plant.
The courts took a wrong turn in Diamond Alkali Company v. P.C. Tomson & Company.57
Diamond was an Ohio manufacturer of soda ash, caustic soda and other related products which
were used by Tomson in its Philadelphia factory. The parties decided that it would make sense to
relocate Tomson’s factory adjacent to Diamond’s. Diamond loaned Tomson $100,000 and sold it
the land for the factory. Tomson agreed to build a plant on the site capable of taking care of its
entire present business, the plant to cost not less than $100,000. Diamond agreed to sell Tomson
all its requirements for five years. Tomson’s president testified as to its reliance on the
agreement:
I think the reason for fixing a period of five years during which the Diamond Alkali
Company would furnish us with our requirements, was that if we only made a
yearly agreement, we would invest in a factory there, and have several hundred
thousand dollars invested in it, and if anything should happen, we couldn't get our
raw material, why, there would be no advantage to it. I think that was one of the
reasons for it. We wanted to be sure of the supply for our manufacturing during
the period of five years operating our new building.58
The seller also relied upon the contract, expanding its capacity after entering into the contract.
Tomson erected the plant in Ohio, but before it had moved its operations to Ohio it sold
its Philadelphia plant, including good will, to a third party and agreed not to enter into the
business again for five years. It then refused to open and operate the Ohio plant. Diamond sued
for equitable relief which was denied, but the Court of Appeals concluded that Tomson had
breached and the case was remanded to determine damages.
The agreement explicitly stated that Tomson was “not to sell, lease or enter into any
contract for the operation of its manufacturing plant at Fairport without the consent of the Alkali
Company during the continuance of this agreement.”59 This term would almost certainly have
prevented someone from operating the Ohio plant without using Diamond’s products. The harder
question is what to do in the situation in which the new factory is abandoned. The court does not
tell us why the sale price of the Philadelphia facility was so attractive that the parties would be
willing to turn their back on a brand new facility that had cost over $100,000 (in pre-Depression
dollars) to build. It must have been a heck of a deal. The court, citing Wells v. Alexandre, held
that the mutual intentions of the parties were that they would continue in business for five years
and that Tomson, by accepting the covenant not to compete, had breached this contract.
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It seems odd that a third party would offer to pay Tomson enough so that in effect it
would be dynamiting its expensive new factory. I suspect that this was not the case and that the
court, confused by its framing of the matter, left out a significant piece of the story. It is silent on
whether anything in the contract with the third party precluded Tomson’s sale of the new plant to
either Diamond or another firm. Since it is likely that such a deal would be a Pareto improvement
over demolition of the new factory, one suspects that resale was the likely outcome. Had it sold
to another (with Diamond’s approval), the requirements contract should remain alive; had it sold
to Diamond, the contract would be moot. The court’s resolution was probably not the final step.
It most likely merely defined the starting point for bargaining over the disposition of the new
plant.
That is all speculation on my part. The significant points are two. First, there is a huge
distinction between the case in which the requirements of the physical facility cease and the case
in which the buyer transfers ownership of the facility, but the facility continues in operation.
Second, the contract gave Tomson the discretion to adapt to changed circumstances; had
Diamond wanted more protection of its reliance, it could have insisted upon minimum payments
(for example, a take-or-pay provision). It chose not, because it believed that Tomson’s selfinterest provided adequate protection for its reliance. The likelihood was very low that Tomson
would find that the most profitable use of a brand new factory would be to close it. There is no
reason to rewrite that contract to give Diamond more protection than it had bargained for.60
The issues in Diamond Alkali were somewhat obscured by the lack of information
regarding the future use of the new plant. Central States Power & Light Corporation v. United
States Zinc Co.,61 which concerned a three-year contract supplying natural gas to a smelter,
presented a simpler problem. The gas supplier would have to construct a pipeline to the smelter;
it appears from the decision that the costs of that pipeline would be covered by the expected
future gas sales. The smelter required about 6.5 million cubic feet of gas per day. The contract
called for a fixed quantity of 3 million cubic feet, but if the buyer’s total requirements did not
reach 3 million, its obligation would be capped by its total requirements.62 The buyer had no
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obligation to resell (or store) gas it could not use. If it operated at more than 50% capacity it
either had to find other suppliers or buy gas from Central States at a price (and other terms) to be
negotiated.
Nine months after signing the contract the buyer, after failing to renegotiate a more
favorable price, dismantled the plant and discontinued its operation. The gas supplier sued,
claiming that the buyer had implicitly promised to stay in business and to continue to have
requirements. The majority, relying in part on Wells and Diamond Alkali, agreed. The buyer
“owning an established business had the implied obligation to continue it in the usual manner, and
accept during the time fixed the gas required to so conduct it.”63 The court in effect took a
contract in which the parties had limited the buyer’s discretion in a way that protected it from
having to be a reseller of gas it could not use, to a take-or-pay contract in which the buyer
promised to pay whether it took the gas or not. The dissent highlighted the distinction between
this case and Wells:
I think the [buyer] was entitled to a directed verdict. The parties agreed upon a partial
supply of gas needed for a particular smelter described in the contract. If that smelter
burned any gas, appellee must purchase it of appellant, up to the specified amount. That is
a fair and valid contract. Vendee could not escape its obligation by selling the smelter; so
long as the smelter required gas, the obligation remained. But does the obligation remain
if the smelter is destroyed by fire, or is razed by a tornado, or is dismantled because of the
collapse of business? In such events, no gas is required for the smelter, and there was no
agreement to buy gas not required. It matters not whether the dismantling occurred in a
year, or a month, or a day. That is the contract the parties made.64
Texas Industries, Inc., v. R. P. Brown et al.,65 a simple variation on Wells, involved a
requirements contract for “aggregate” (an input into the manufacture of concrete masonry units)
to supply three of buyer’s plants. The seller built a new plant at a cost of $500,000 to serve the
three plants. The buyer then leased its plants to a group of lessees and thereafter argued that the
leasing arrangement extinguished the contractual obligation, despite the fact that the plants
continued to operate and to have requirements. The court held for the seller, but lumped this case
with others in which the plant’s requirements were zero (as in the previous two cases).

exceed the two or three million per day that vendee shall be required to take only the amount of
its total requirements.” At 832.
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In these circumstances, the law of Texas imposes an implied obligation upon the
buyers to keep the plants in operation lest, by disposing of them or shutting them
down, the buyers be permitted to destroy the subject matter of the contract, the
requirements of the plants, in violation of the intention of the parties that sales and
purchases under it would continue for the full term thereof. This rule was
recognized in a decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in 1951, Portland
Gasoline Co. v. Superior Marketing Co., Inc., 150 Tex. 533, 243 S.W.2d 823,
825, wherein was cited Williston on Contracts, Rev.Ed., Vol. 1, pp. 357-358,
which refers to a class of cases that finds from the business situation, from the
conduct of the parties, and from the startlingly disproportionate burden cast upon
one of them, a promise implied in fact by the seller to continue in good faith sales
or production, or on the part of the buyer to maintain his business or plant as a
going concern, and to take its bona fide requirements. “In other words, this view
implies an obligation to carry out the contract in the way anticipated, and not for
purposes of speculation to the injury of the other party.”66
The agreement itself made clear that it would not terminate because of sale, assignment, and so
forth.67 The buyer invoked the contract language, apparently because leasing was not specifically
mentioned. The court, however, rejected this argument, holding that the language made it clear
“that the contracting parties took pains to anticipate and provide against contingencies such as are
now being put forward as reasons for terminating the contract.”68 That should have been the
dispositive issue–did the contract survive the substitution of parties. Invocation of good faith and
disproportionate burdens is quite beside the point.
Tri-state Generation and Transmission Association, Inc. v. Shoshone River Power, Inc.69
illustrates how a party might opportunistically sell its business in an effort to get out from under
an onerous requirements contract. Tri-state, a generation and transmission (G&T) cooperative,
provided electricity to 25 distribution cooperatives including Shoshone. Part of Tri-state’s
financing came from the Rural Electrification Administration (the REA) which required as a
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“Nothing in this agreement contained shall prevent any party hereto from consolidating
or merging its operation into another operation, or from changing the form of organization, or
from selling, conveying, or exchanging its property as an entirety or substantially as an entirety,
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exchanges shall be binding upon the organization resulting from or succeeding to the ownership of
the property as an entirety or substantially as an entirety, to the intent that the terms and
provisions of this contract shall inure to the benefit of and be binding upon the parties hereto, and
upon the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns of each party hereto.” At 513.
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condition of its loans that its G&T borrowers get requirements contracts of matching maturity.
Shoshone’s original contract was of 33 years duration, and the most recent modification had
extended the life to 43 years. The requirements contracts between Tri-state and its member
distribution cooperatives were meant to be security for the loans; however, there was no
minimum payment. Shoshone had over 1,000 members to whom it supplied electricity. The
arrangement worked fine for decades, but in the mid-1980's when fuel prices collapsed, Tri-state’s
prices remained high. Pacific Power & Light Company offered to supply Shoshone and other
distribution cooperatives at prices substantially below Tri-state’s.70 To take advantage of
Pacific’s low prices, Shoshone agreed to sell to Pacific its assets, which consisted of the powerdelivery subscriptions of its members and, to a lesser extent, its poles and power lines. That is,
Shoshone’s members would continue to have electricity requirements, but these would be
supplied by Pacific, not Tri-state.
Tri-state attempted to enjoin the merger. The court denied specific performance, but
found that Shoshone’s action was a breach of the contract and awarded damages. The majority
held that “as a matter of law, . . . when there are sufficient members in Shoshone’s system
requiring electric power, a sale of Shoshone’s assets or member subscriptions to Pacific cannot
qualify as a good faith reduction or elimination of requirements.”71 The dissent, which would
have remanded for a new trial on liability, noted that the seller could have achieved greater
protection of its reliance by including a take-or-pay clause in the contract. It also remarked on the
lack of provisions preventing the sale of the business or making the contract binding on the
buyer’s successors or assigns. In effect, the court came up with a plausible default rule—the
requirements are defined by the physical assets, not by the identity of the contracting party. The
moral is blurred, however, by a convoluted opinion which relies extensively on Diamond Alkali
and Central States, failing to recognize that in both these cases the facilities would not remain in
operation.
For a decision suggesting that the default rule be that the agreement should survive the
sale of the asset, see Proctor v. Union Coal Co..72 “... the construction [of the contract] that the
defendant could terminate the plaintiff's rights at any time by a sale of the premises, would leave
the plaintiff wholly at the mercy [of the defendant].... It is not to be presumed that the parties
intended so unreasonable an agreement, in the absence of language expressing such intention.”73 I
am not insisting that this default rule is the right one. So long as the barriers to contracting
around this default rule are low, it should not much matter. My point is that the cases in which
the party sells the underlying asset are analytically different from those in which the party closes
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down the plant or drastically reduces its requirements. Those cases are the subject of the next
Section.
IV. Reduced Requirements
Most commentators agree that the law, both pre- and post-Code, treated increases and
decreases asymmetrically.74 A dispute continues over whether the "unreasonably
disproportionate" language of the UCC applies on the down side; the 1999 revised draft of the
UCC suggests that the drafters desire symmetry.75 The preference for asymmetric treatment
stems from the recognition that there is less opportunity for the quantity-determining party to take
advantage of price variations by decreasing its requirements. A requirements buyer could increase
its purchases without limit (if the contract placed no limit) to take advantage of a rising market,
but it could only cut its requirements to zero to take advantage of a market price decline.
The Code puts considerable emphasis on the role of quantity estimates and prior dealings
between the parties in imposing extra-contractual limits on the quantity-determining party's
discretion. Even under the Code, however, a buyer could, in "good faith" substantially cut back,
or even eliminate, its requirements. But "good faith" is interpreted, heaven knows why, to mean
that the firm can shut down for lack of orders, but not to curtail losses.76 No attempt is made to
relate this standard to any economic context. Why would businesses want this default rule,
especially if it is difficult to contract around? A simpler starting point would be a default rule
which gives complete flexibility on the down side with the only concern being avoidance by
change of title (as discussed in the previous section).
In this Section I will consider eight quantity-reduction cases. In the first three, the court
upheld the reduction, although the last decision was most likely incorrect. In the next three the
court invoked good faith to undo a perfectly sensible allocation of discretion. I then analyze
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“The question is whether the lack of output or requirements occurred in good faith, not
whether the lack of actual output or requirements was ‘unreasonably disproportionate.’ This
follows the interpretation of prior 2-306(1) in Empire Gas Corp. v. American Bakeries Co., 840
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Empire Gas Corporation v. American Bakeries,77 in which a watered down version of the good
faith standard is still potent enough to subject a buyer to millions in damages for a failure to have
any requirements. I conclude with a brief description of a recent decision which illustrates the
futility of relying on a good faith standard absent a coherent framework for understanding the
transaction.
The case cited in the UCC comments for the proposition that a firm can drastically reduce
its requirements in good faith is Southwest Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma Portland Cement Co..78
A cement company had a fifteen year requirements contract for provision of all its natural gas
needs.79 It subsequently redesigned its boilers so that they would utilize the waste heat of the
kilns and this resulted in a substantial decrease in the amount of gas needed to power the boilers.
The gas company's attempt to enjoin the use of waste heat as a violation of the contract was
denied. The result was surely correct, but it was softened by the court's language.
The term of the contract here involved was 15 years. That was longer than the
ordinary life of certain of the appliances and equipment in the cement plant. It is a
reasonable assumption that the parties contemplated whenever it became necessary
to renew worn-out equipment, the Cement Company would install modern
equipment in its place. Certainly, the parties did not contemplate that the contract
should obligate the Cement Company to replace worn-out equipment with a like
type of equipment that had become obsolete in the cement manufacturing industry,
or not to utilize fully, modern equipment when installed. We are of the opinion
that the Cement Company had the right to install modern equipment whenever it
was necessary to replace worn-out equipment so long as in so doing it acted bona
fide.
The boiler plant of the Cement Company became worn out in 1933. To replace it
the Cement Company installed a modern boiler system similar to the types
generally used in other cement manufacturing plants. In the improved plant a new
or different fuel was not substituted for gas, but a more efficient and economical
utilization of gas was effected, so that the heat resulting from the combustion of
the gas in the kilns was used both to heat the product in the kilns, and the boilers. .
. . In so improving its plant, the Cement Company acted in good faith and in the
exercise of prudent business judgment. That it had the right to do.80
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"Bona fide," "good faith," and "prudent business judgment" presumably impose some constraints
on the buyer, but what? If the relative price of an alternative fuel fell, could the Cement Company
switch? Would that be “imprudent?”
The most plausible explanation for the structure of the fifteen-year contract is that the
cement company needed assurance of a continued supply and that replacement of Southwest by
another supplier would have been difficult. Southwest, on the other hand, likely supplied a
number of customers and had only modest relation-specific investments. If that is indeed the case,
then we would expect that the contract would give the buyer considerable assurance of supply
and the flexibility to alter the amount taken as circumstances change. That does not, of course,
mean that the gas company need grant it unlimited discretion. Possibly, it might want to confront
the cement company with an additional cost when it contemplated a change to a less gas-intensive
technology if relative prices or technology changed. But why rely on an after-the-fact review by a
court or jury guided by such loose language as "good faith" or "prudent business judgment?" The
parties could fine-tune the gas company's protection in a number of ways. The simplest would be
to impose a minimum quantity, perhaps in the form of a take-or-pay arrangement. Or the gas
company could be given a right to revise or terminate following the occurrence of certain events
(a change in relative prices of a certain magnitude, a reduction in quantity beyond a certain point,
a finding by an arbitrator that the technology has changed). Such protection was likely
unnecessary, since I doubt that the gas company had any need to protect its reliance. But why,
absent explicit language, should there be any presumption that the buyer was promising to adapt
inefficiently as new information became available?
In Northern Indiana Public Service Company v. Colorado Westmoreland, Inc.81 Judge
Easterbrook, sitting by designation, held in favor of a public utility purchaser which had
substantially reduced its coal requirements. NIPSCO entered into long-term contracts with
Colorado Westmoreland in 1977 which were renegotiated in 1980 and again in 1982. The dispute
concerned its performance under the last contract. That contract was for its requirements at a
particular generating facility. The contract included both estimated requirements (about one
million tons per year) and a maximum annual obligation by the seller (1.25 million tons).82 In
finding for the utility, Judge Easterbrook provided elaborate detail on the nature of the transaction
and its negotiating history.
The contract was one of two NIPSCO contracts for low-sulphur western coal. The other
was with Carbon County Coal Company. After fuel prices collapsed in the early 1980's NIPSCO
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The seller also agreed to use best efforts to meet requirements in excess of 1.25 million
tons; it is not clear whether the contract price would carry over to the additional output. The
contract also placed a limit on the seller's total commitment. It could not enter into contracts with
others which when added to the coal it was obliged to deliver to NIPSCO would exceed the
capacity of the mine.
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sought declaratory judgments regarding both contracts. It sought, and failed, to be excused from
the Carbon County contract, a fixed quantity contract with an indexed price well above the
current market price.83 In the CWI contract, NIPSCO wanted a judgment that, despite a
substantial reduction in requirements, the contract was still in force. In addition to these two
contracts, NIPSCO was supplied by an unspecified number of high-sulphur Midwestern coal
companies with less expensive coal. NIPSCO had eleven coal-fired generating units. The CWI
contract was for the requirements of one particular unit, Schahfer 15. To simplify the story
somewhat, when determining which units to operate, NIPSCO had to balance the costs of
generating at those units and the reliability of the system; it also had to take into account
directives from the regulatory commission (economy purchase orders) and the possibility that the
commission would not allow it to recover all its costs. As a consequence, NIPSCO started using
more high-sulphur and less low-sulphur coal. In addition, hard times in the steel industry—a
major determinant of the demand for NIPSCO’s power—led to a scaling back of power needs.
So, despite the contract estimate of approximately one million tons of coal per year, requirements
in 1983-1985 ranged from 573,000 tons to 713,000.84
CWI argued that a quantity reduction of this magnitude was not in good faith, citing
Comment 3 of §2-306.85 Judge Easterbrook rejected the argument on four grounds: (a) NIPSCO
acted in commercial good faith; (b) the variance from the estimate was only 45%; (c) the parties
dickered over the boundaries on the requirements and the court should not read language into the
agreement which the parties explicitly chose not to include; and (d) the restrictions in the statute
are asymmetric, applying only to the buyer who attempts to unduly increase his requirements.86
The most interesting aspect of the opinion for my purposes is the rich description of the
contractual alternatives considered by the parties before they settled on the final language. CWI
initially proposed a minimum-take contract. Alternatively, CWI suggested a 900,000-ton “walk
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-30-

away” provision. If NIPSCO ordered less than 900,000 tons in any year, CWI would have the
option of declining to fill the orders and canceling the contract.87 If NIPSCO were concerned
about protecting its long-term supply of coal, then it might place orders just to keep the
agreement alive. In effect, by purchasing coal that it did not need today, NIPSCO would be
renewing its option to purchase coal tomorrow. If NIPSCO did not exercise the option, then
CWI could choose to terminate the deal. The risk of termination would have been one of the
costs that NIPSCO would have to consider when deciding whether it should order coal that it did
not need today. All this was moot as NIPSCO rejected both the minimum-take and the walk
away provision. In a proposed draft, NIPSCO proposed a clause that would define the
parameters of its discretion:
[1] Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be construed to require the use of
coal for generation of electrical energy or to prohibit Buyer from utilizing any and
all other or substitute sources of energy as may become available; [2] nor shall
anything in this Agreement be construed to require the purchase of more coal than
needed for the operation of Buyer's Schahfer Unit 15; [3] nor shall anything in this
Agreement be construed to cause Buyer to operate Schahfer Unit 15 to any
greater extent than Buyer in its sole discretion deems prudent, either as to hours of
operation or as to load carried on said Schahfer Unit 15; [4] nor shall anything in
this Agreement be construed to prevent Buyer from operating any and all of its
generating stations, including Schahfer Unit 15, and utilizing other sources of
power supply in the most efficient, economical, and prudent manner for the
production and supply of electrical energy for Buyer's Customers. . .88
In the course of the negotiations both the first and third clause were eliminated. The first
deletion means that the generating unit could not be shifted to an alternative fuel without CWI’s
permission. The other deletion is harder to explain since the language of the next clause seems to
allow NIPSCO to justify its decisions on roughly the same grounds. Judge Easterbrook
concluded that deleting the clause allowed CWI to protect itself against irrational changes in
requirements.89 Nonetheless, it is clear that the contract would, with one exception, allow the
buyer to adapt to changed circumstances by varying its requirements in a way that it reasonably
perceived to be in its long-term economic interest without having to get the permission of, consult
with, or pay CWI. The exception, as noted, was a change in the relative price of fuels.
Again, it should be emphasized, this allocation of decision making was hardly inevitable.
Indeed, in its contract with Carbon County NIPSCO opted for a very different arrangement in
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The revised contract also tacked on a somewhat cryptic clause requiring that the buyer
treat the seller no less fairly than its other producers of coal. (At 615)
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which it sacrificed its quantity flexibility. Carbon County had only one customer and the mine
was developed only after the contract had been entered into, so there was an obvious interest in
protecting the seller’s reliance. On the other hand, CWI’s mine was already developed and the
Schahfer unit built when the parties entered into this requirements contract. It is not clear from
the opinion whether CWI had other customers (although its proposed “walk away” term suggests
strongly that it did). CWI needed less protection of its reliance than did Carbon County and
therefore was more willing to give NIPSCO control of the quantity decision. Judge Easterbrook
did not allow the fine-tuning of the parties to be trumped by the wooden standards of the UCC.
In an earlier case, Willapa Electric Company, v. S. L. Dennis Construction Company et
al the Washington Supreme Court gave a very narrow reading to a minimum payment clause,
finding in favor of a buyer who ceased to have requirements. An electric company entered into a
five-year contract to provide all the electricity needs at the site of a rock crusher. Service
required construction of two miles of new pole and wire line at a cost of about $4,000 preDepression dollars.91 The costs of those poles would be amortized over the life of the agreement.
To protect itself against the buyer's reducing its purchases, the contract established a minimum
monthly payment. In the event that the buyer violated the contract and no longer had any
requirements, the minimum payment would become due immediately.92 The buyer disconnected
from the power system and refused to make the minimum payment. The Supreme Court of
Washington overturned a trial court verdict for the power company, giving what appears to be a
very strained reading to the contract language. The minimum monthly charge, it suggested,
"means only that, when the consumer maintains a connected load, or wholly disconnects the
connected load and fails to notify the electric company of such disconnection, the consumer must
pay for the load up to the time of notice of disconnection thereof, whether 'used or not.'"93 It
dismissed evidence of the power company's reliance expenditures on the two miles of lines it built
to serve this customer by noting that "there is no language in the power contract pointing to that
expenditure on the part of the electric company as furnishing any consideration for the obligation
90
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assumed by the construction company of taking or paying for 'power to be required or used by
consumer on said premises.'"94
The opinion is short on detail, so it is possible, I suppose, that the court's interpretation of
the language is correct. But unlikely. The dissent pointed out that in the contract between the
initial customer and its assignee, they had agreed that if the power contract were canceled, they
would split the cancellation fee fifty-fifty, with the assignee's liability capped at $1,500. That is,
the buyer (and the assignee) presumed that the minimum payment was take-or-pay. Moreover,
the seller's substantial reliance expenditure is consistent with this interpretation. So, the case was,
most likely, wrongly decided. It stands out in stark contrast to other cases which overshoot in the
other direction, in particular the three that follow.
Feld v. Henry S. Levy & Sons, Inc.,95 the leading New York case, illustrates how the good
faith implication makes a simple case hard and undoes a sensible allocation of decision making.
Levy & Sons operated a wholesale bread baking business. As part of its operations it generated
considerable waste product in the form of stale or imperfectly appearing loaves. One option for
disposing of this material was to convert it into "bread crumbs" by removing the labels, processing
the loaves through two grinders, toasting the product in an oven and bagging it. It purchased the
oven and entered into a one year evergreen (automatically renewed) contract with the Crushed
Toast Company which agreed to purchase "all bread crumbs produced by the Seller in its factory
at 115 Thames Street, Brooklyn, New York"96 at a price of 6¢ a pound. Either party could cancel
on six months notice. The Crushed Toast Company was required to deliver a "faithful
performance bond," presumably to provide assurance to Levy of timely removal of the waste. In
the first eleven months, Levy delivered about $30,000 worth of bread crumbs. Apparently the
operation was not profitable for Levy. It attempted to renegotiate the contract price up to 7¢, but
was rebuffed. One month before the end of the first year Levy ceased production of bread crumbs
and dismantled the toasting oven. The waste was then sold to animal food manufacturers. Feld
sued for breach.
Supreme Court denied both parties' motion for summary judgment. Appellate Division
affirmed over a strong dissent which would have (properly) granted Levy's motion for summary
judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed unanimously, rejecting the dissenters' argument that the
language was clear and unambiguous and that there could be no inference that Levy had promised
to continue to produce bread crumbs to sell to plaintiff. The court first noted that output
contracts were not unenforceable because the seller was required to conduct his business in good
faith. The seller was not free to decide whether he should produce any bread crumbs. "The
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seller's duty to remain in crumb production is a matter calling for close scrutiny of its motives."97
That scrutiny would require data on "the actual cost of the finished bread crumbs to defendant,
statements as to the profits derived or the losses sustained, or data specifying the net or gross
return realized from the animal food transactions."98 Moreover, "[s]ince bread crumbs were but a
part of defendant's enterprise and since there was a contractual right of cancellation, good faith
requires continued production until cancellation, even if there be no profit. In circumstances such
as these and without more, defendant would be justified, in good faith, in ceasing production of
the single item prior to cancellation only if its losses from continuance would be more than trivial,
which, overall, is a question of fact."99
The court failed to recognize that, in its own statement of the facts, it had already
provided the relevant economic data. The contract price was six cents per pound and Levy's
actions (dismantling the oven) indicate that this amount would not even cover the variable costs;
it was cheaper to shut the project down. However, Levy indicated that a price of seven cents per
pound would have been sufficient to warrant its continued operation of the toaster oven. So, the
fight is over one penny. The court gives no hint as to how that information would help answer
the question it has posed. Further, it glosses over the question of why Levy's termination of an
operation that does not cover variable costs would be in bad faith. Given the incoherence of the
question, the elusiveness of the answer is hardly surprising.
That this was an output contract rather than a requirements contract matters not. It can
be viewed as a requirements contract for a service—waste removal.100 The deformed loaves and
day old bread were waste products that happened, by chance, to have a positive market value for
various uses. Suppose, instead that they were of no value and that Levy had entered into a
contract to have all its trash hauled away at a price of, say, 3¢ a pound. The only difference is
that the net flow of cash now would be from Levy to Feld. Can one seriously argue that Levy has
a duty to stay in business to produce garbage for Feld to haul away? Yet that is precisely what
the court has done.
It is conceivable that a producer would under certain circumstances promise to produce a
specific level of a waste product. That, recall, was what the oil refineries promised to the
aluminum companies who were building calciners in reliance upon the refineries’ coke output.101
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The contrast between the GLC and aluminum contracts suggests the conditions in which the
parties might want to give substantial protection to the trash remover’s reliance interest. Those
conditions are certainly not met in Feld v. Levy. The facts are spotty, but a reasonable inference
is that the Crushed Toast Company was in existence prior to the formation of this contract, that it
had other suppliers, and that toasted bread crumbs could be held in inventory at less expense and
for a greater period of time than unsold loaves of bread. Hence its willingness to subject itself
both to Levy’s discretion in determining the bread crumb production and to post a faithful
performance bond. The fact that Levy, the party that had carefully protected its reliance because
it had purchased an oven for making bread crumbs and had a clear need to assure the removal of
unsold loaves, dismantled the oven should have been sufficient to end the inquiry. Instead the
court, under the banner of good faith, encouraged a fruitless inquiry into the costs and revenues
associated with the two alternative ways of disposing of the waste.102
A half century earlier, the New York Court of Appeals mishandled a similar case. In
Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Company,103 the defendant, a brewer, entered into an
agreement in which it agreed to sell to the plaintiff all the “wet grains” produced at its brewery for
a five year period, or until 500,000 barrels of beer had been brewed. Wet grains were a waste
product of the brewing process which would then be dried and sold as cattle feed. Wigand
would, under the contract, install a plant for drying the grains in Bachmann-Bechtel’s brewery. It
had in previous years installed such plants in other breweries. The cost of installation was $6,050,
borne entirely by Wigand. At the end of the five years (or after the 500,000 barrels had been

controls” limiting the ability of clients to dispose of their waste outside the jurisdiction. These
fencing-garbage-in ordinances have generated a considerable amount of litigation. In C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Town Of Clarkstown, New York,114 S.Ct. 1677 (1994), the Supreme Court
found one such ordinance a violation of the dormant commerce clause. For a sampling of postCarbone flow control cases, many of which turn back challenges to the ordinances, see, Houlton
Citizens' Coalition v. Town Of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178 (1999); Automated Salvage Transport, Inc.
v. Wheelabrator Environmental Systems, Inc., 155 F.3d 59 (1998); National Solid Waste
Management Association v. Williams, 146 F.3d 595 (1998); Ben Oehrleins and Sons and
Daughter, Inc. v. Hennepin County, 115 F.3d 1372 (8th Cir.); and Sal Tinnerello & Sons, Inc. v.
Town of Stonington, 141 F.3d 46 (2d Cir.1998).
102

In another case involving sale of a waste product, Neofotistos v. Harvard Brewing
Co.341 Mass. 684, 171 N.E.2d 865 (1961), a brewery promised to sell all its waste grain to the
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company performance bond. After sustaining substantial losses, the brewer closed the brewery.
Plaintiff’s claim that the brewery should have continued to produce grains was rejected. The case
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reliance–the importance of removal and the requirement that the buyer post a bond–is of more
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produced), title to the drying plant would be transferred to the brewer. Wigand’s compensation
would come entirely in the form of a favorable price for the wet grains of six cents per barrel of
beer.104 The contract included an excuse clause broader than the typical force majeure clause:
Should the party of the first part hereto be prevented from operating its brewery by
reason of strikes, break-downs in machinery, or for any reason whether beyond its
control or otherwise, then and in that event this contract and the performance
thereof by the party of the first part shall stand in abeyance until the brewery of the
party of the first part shall again be in operation.105
In the first 21 months the brewery produced 158,000 barrels of beer and both parties
complied with the contract. Then the brewer sold its beer business (but not the physical plant) to
another brewer. It covenanted with the purchaser that it would not operate its brewery for two
years. It complied with the covenant and, for reasons unstated, did not reopen the brewery even
after the two years had expired. Wigand sued and ultimately prevailed, although the Court of
Appeals rejected the jury verdict of $8,500 and remanded for a new trial.106
The court put great weight on Wigand’s reliance on the brewery’s continued operation in
concluding that the brewery had breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The mutual promises in the contract, many of which we have stated, are such that
a voluntary and intentional failure to perform by the defendant would be
inequitable and unjust. The large expenditure by the plaintiff for machinery which
he placed in the defendant's plant for which pay could only be obtained by him
through a continuance of the business; the furnishing by him of $5,000 to the
defendant, only to be returned by deductions from the purchase price of the wet
grains received; the necessity of expenditures to keep the plant in repair and for
insurance as stated for the full period of five years, are important facts to be
considered in determining what was meant by the defendant when it promised to
sell to the plaintiff “all of the wet brewery grains produced from the brewing at its
brewery” as in the contract provided.107
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In addition, Wigand advanced about $5,000 to the brewer for modifications of the
brewery so that the drying plant could be installed. That was to be paid back at $250 per month
to be offset against Wigand’s payments for wet grain.
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Wigand won at trial; that verdict was reversed by Appellate Division (169 A.D. 285;
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In Feld, the seller had made the significant relation-specific investment—the toasting
oven. Here, the relation-specific investments (over $6,000 in pre-WWI dollars) were made by the
buyer. Recoupment depended on the continued operation of the brewery. Wigand could have
reduced its reliance by phasing its compensation differently. Failing that, it might have forced the
brewery to take this reliance into account when making decisions on how much beer to produce
or whether to produce beer at all. It could, for example, have insisted that if the brewery were
shut down, the brewer would have to purchase the drying plant for a fraction of the $6,050
related to the length of time the drying plant had operated. Instead it relied, not unreasonably, on
the seller’s self-interest. Under most circumstances the brewer would find operating the brewery
more attractive than moth-balling or destroying it.108 But in those rare cases (as the present)
where the brewery seems to be worth more dead than alive, Wigand’s reliance remains
unprotected, at least until the court comes in and trumps the agreement. It is possible that the
brewery might agree ex ante that it would have to pay a fee to the waste removal firm if it chose
to go out of business to cover at least some of Wigand’s reliance costs. But is it likely? Other
suppliers, notably workers, also relied on continued operation of the brewery and presumably
received nothing. The court simply found an implausible duty to produce waste, imposing a
particular vision of the balance between discretion and reliance other than the one designed by the
parties.109
In yet another tail-wags-dog opinion, the New York Court of Appeals held that a
Manhattan hotel should remain in operation for the benefit of a parking garage (or pay the
consequences).110 The Savoy Hilton entered into a five year contract with the parking garage,
promising to use reasonable efforts to enable the garage to have “the exclusive right and privilege
of storing the motor vehicles of [the hotel’s] guests, tenants and patrons.”111 The garage agreed
to pay the hotel ten percent of the transient storage charges incurred by the hotel guests. Thus,
the garage paid a fee for the hotel’s encouraging patronage. The garage was about one-half mile
from the hotel. (Only in New York!) Savoy purchased the hotel (which was over thirty years
old) shortly before it entered into the contract. Less than two years after entering into the
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Recall the discussion of Diamond Alkali and Central States above at notes 57-61. The
decision does not discuss whether the brewery was reopened by someone else or simply closed
down.
109

Contrast Wigand with Hamlyn, note 52, which also involved removal of the waste
grains from the brewery. There, the court held that the brewery’s discontinuance did not create
liability, even though production continued, albeit under different ownership.
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record. In addition to affidavits by the principals, each side introduced an article from the New
York Times.
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agreement, Savoy demolished the hotel. There was some dispute over the reason. The owner
claimed that it was losing money on the hotel and that there was no hope of making it profitable.
The plaintiff claimed that the real reason for demolition was that the land had a higher and better
use—namely construction of a fifty-story office building (the General Motors Building just south
of Central Park). The plaintiff made much of the motive in his affidavit and briefs, but the claims
of both sides come down to the same point: the hotel was worth more dead than alive.
The parking garage sued for damages for lost profits during the last three years of the
agreement.112 Judge Breitel, speaking for a unanimous Court of Appeals, reversed summary
judgment for the hotel and remanded.113 The court framed the question in a neutral way: “The
real issue in this case is . . . whether this agreement imports an implication that Savoy was
obligated to remain in the hotel business, or, better, had undertaken indefeasible obligations for
the full term.”114 It recognized “the incongruity of an enterprise, as large as a metropolitan hotel,
being obligated to ‘continue in the hotel business’ merely because of various relatively minor
incidental service contracts, such as that involved here.”115 Nonetheless, the court asserted a
default rule: when the promisee relies upon the promisor’s continued activity, a promise to remain
in business will be implied. Savoy could avoid this result in two ways. Ex ante, Savoy could have
included an express term in the contract that would terminate the agreement if the hotel went out
of business. Ex post, Savoy could invoke custom or usage in the industry to show that incidental
service contracts are terminable on the hotel’s going out of business.
So, the net result is a default rule which could be overcome by explicit contract language
or by demonstrating that people in the industry knew (or should have known) that the default rule
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The garage did not attempt to obtain an injunction that would have given it the right to
hold out for a piece of the increased value of the office building. A New York Times article,
introduced by the plaintiff, identified two tenants who did have the right to throw a monkey
wrench into the planned conversion. The two threatened to remain in business if their terms were
not met, and Savoy, in turn, threatened to raze the hotel around them and construct the office
building on the remainder of the site. See William Robbins, “New G.M. Building May Rise
Around 2 Tenants; Coffee House and Flower Shop Owners May Stay Till Leases Expire,” New
York Times, Dec. 12, 1965, Section 8, Page 1, Column 2. In fact, [what happened?]
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While this was not a variable quantity contract, Supreme Court classified it as a
requirements contract and granted summary judgment to the hotel because there had been no
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Savoy is not a ‘requirements’ contract, but is akin to the grant of a license or franchise by Savoy
to the garage.” (At 278) The court then went on to note that categorization was not particularly
helpful in analyzing the case.
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does not apply here. The court gave no reason why the default rule should give complete
protection to the garage’s reliance with no concern for the hotel’s discretion. Nor does it indicate
how one should give content to the custom and usage standard. Whose custom and usage?
Hotels? Parking garages? Hotels dealing with parking garages? In Manhattan? Would the
custom and usage depend on whether the garage owner relied upon the contract in building the
garage, whether the hotel customers constituted 100% (or 50% or 5%) of the expected revenues
of the garage? The garage’s interest in protecting its reliance depends crucially on these matters.
Under most circumstances, the garage would require only modest (if any) protection of its
reliance; indeed, the most plausible scenario is that the multi-year agreement was designed to
protect the reliance of the hotel which was concerned about the consequences of not having a
convenient parking garage nearby.
Suppose that instead of closing, the Savoy had changed its business strategy. Perhaps it
chose to remodel and offer fewer, and larger, rooms. Would it have to compensate the garage
during the remodeling period or for the lower number of potential patrons? Could it introduce a
subsidized airport shuttle service which would result in a smaller number of patrons with cars to
be parked? Could it close the hotel restaurant for lunches or on Monday evenings? Would it
have to clear its advertising budgets with the parking garage? Would we expect a hotel to require
approval from (or to promise payment to) a parking garage as it adapts its business decisions to
changing circumstances? If the court does not mean to hold the hotel responsible for these
decisions, how does one draw the line between these and the decision to tear the hotel down?
Must these all be fact questions relying on proof of custom and usage? It makes little sense to
have a fact-sensitive default rule where the fact is so elusive.
The three preceding cases are like shooting fish in a barrel, at least when one is armed with
the right tools. Empire Gas Corporation v. American Bakeries Company116 presents a more
difficult problem. After entering into a requirements contract, the buyer changed his mind and
had no requirements for the life of the contract. The seller sued and won a jury verdict in excess
of $3 million. On appeal, Judge Posner upheld the verdict. Although the contract concerned
potential sales of more than $5 million and was between firms with combined sales in 1980 of
around $1 billion, the agreement was prepared by two laymen without, it appears, any assistance
from counsel.117
American Bakeries was a distributor of bakery goods in different parts of the country,
operating a large fleet of trucks. Concern over the energy crisis of the late 1970's sparked interest
in the possibility of converting part of its fleet to the use of propane gas. It entered into a fouryear requirements contract with Empire for provision of conversion units (approximately 3,000
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840 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1988).
646 F. Supp. 269, 271 (1986).
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“more or less, depending upon requirements of Buyer”118) and propane motor fuel. The units
would give the trucks the capability of running on either fuel. Empire did not manufacture
conversion units; it would purchase them elsewhere and supply them to American. The contract
fixed the price for the conversion units ($750 a piece), but did not give the brand or specifications.
Empire had at least five brands of conversion equipment in inventory and the court opinions
suggest that delivery of any of these would have been appropriate at the contract price. Empire
was not in the business of marketing conversion equipment;119 its primary concern was sale of
propane. American agreed to take its requirements of propane from Empire at (roughly) the
market price. The pricing term was a loosely worded “meeting competition” clause:
In consideration of providing propane dispensing equipment, American Bakeries
Company agrees to purchase propane motor fuel solely from Empire Gas
Corporation at all locations where Empire Gas has supplied carburetion and
dispensing equipment as long as Empire Gas Corporation remains in a reasonably
competitive price posture with other major suppliers. Buyer may elect to call for
price negotiations at which time seller will have the opportunity to alter buyer's
price to buyer's satisfaction. . . .120
In addition, Empire promised to provide American with propane dispensing equipment, including
a 1,000 gallon tank, at no charge at all locations where Empire supplied dispensing services.121
After the agreement was signed, American advised Empire that it was having financial
difficulties. For over a year American failed to take any conversion units or propane, but
informed Empire that it intended to honor the contract. Finally, Empire sent an invoice for the
purchase of 3,000 conversion units which it claimed to be holding in inventory. American refused
to accept conversion units or pay for them and Empire sued for lost profits both on the
conversion units and the propane. The jury concluded that, but for the breach, Empire would
have sold 2242 conversion units (an exactitude suggesting capriciousness) to American; that it
had lost profits on these sales of about $600,000, roughly 36% per unit; and that the lost profits
from the foregone propane sales were $2.6 million.
Judge Posner suggested that, on the basis of the negotiating history, the contract could
have been interpreted as one for a fixed quantity of conversion units. The reason for this
conclusion is unclear since he also noted that American rejected Empire’s standard contract which
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1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1324, at 2. The courts ignored the open-ended nature of the
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called for a minimum number of conversion units per month.122 Regardless, the parties agreed
that the agreement should be classified as a requirements contract and therefore that it fell under
UCC §2-306.
In interpreting UCC §2-306 he adopted the majority position holding that a reduction in
requirements was constrained only by the buyer’s good faith, not by the “unreasonably
disproportionate” proviso. American would have been acting in bad faith had it purchased
conversion units or propane from competitors;123 and it would not have been acting in bad faith “if
it had a business reason for deciding not to convert that was independent of the terms of the
contract or any other aspect of its relationship with Empire Gas, such as a drop in the demand for
its bakery products that led it to reduce or abandon its fleet of delivery trucks.”124 If American
simply changed its mind without a reason, this presented a more difficult case. The requirements
contract could plausibly be characterized as giving American an option, but that, Posner
concluded, was not the law.125
The essential ingredient of good faith in the case of the buyer's reducing his
estimated requirements is that he not merely have had second thoughts about the
terms of the contract and want to get out of it. Whether the buyer has any greater
obligation is unclear, . . . but need not be decided here. Once it is decided (as we
have) that a buyer cannot arbitrarily declare his requirements to be zero, this
becomes an easy case, because American Bakeries has never given any reason for
its change of heart.126
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It is not clear why one would choose to characterize this as “bad faith” rather than as a
flat-out breach.
124

At 1339.

125

“If no reason at all need be given for scaling back one's requirements even to zero, then
a requirements contract is from the buyer's standpoint just an option to purchase up to (or slightly
beyond, i.e., within the limits of reasonable proportionality) the stated estimate on the terms
specified in the contract, except that the buyer cannot refuse to exercise the option because
someone offers him better terms. This is not an unreasonable position, but it is not the law.” (At
1339.)
126

At 1340-41.
-41-

Good faith, according to Judge Posner, puts a burden on the buyer to give a valid business reason
(other than “I changed my mind”) for the failure to take any goods. American did not give any
reason and, apparently, could not. Ergo, its action must have been in bad faith.127
The contract differs from others discussed in this paper in that it was a two-stage
requirements contract. American agreed to buy all its propane requirements from Empire; it
would only have propane requirements if it had conversion units and these too it promised to buy
only from Empire. It is useful to analyze the contract in two stages, beginning first with the
propane stage. Had American installed the conversion units, then its requirements would have
depended on overall fuel needs (the demand for its products) and on the relative cost of fuels. If
gasoline prices had fallen relative to propane, American could have reduced its requirements to
zero. That was precisely the flexibility it had bargained for. It was crystal clear to both parties
that the only reason to go through with this contract was to have vehicles that could use either
fuel and to allow Empire to choose the most efficient. If the two fuels were very close
substitutes, we should anticipate that fairly minor fluctuations in relative prices would have
resulted in dramatic shifts in American’s requirements. That is how Judge Posner interpreted the
agreement.128 Empire could have demanded some limits on American’s discretion to protect its
reliance. It is hard to imagine that much protection would have been necessary, given the meeting
competition clause and the fact that Empire had a large number of propane customers at most
locations. Not surprisingly, the contract provided no explicit protection (e.g., minimum purchases
of propane); Empire bore the risk that the relative price of propane would rise and that American
would purchase gasoline instead.
Of course, since American never took any of the conversion units, the propane
requirements were never an issue. The requirements for conversion units would also be sensitive
to the relative prices of propane and gasoline—not the day-to-day fluctuations that would have
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The dissent disagreed: “The majority thus transforms the seller's theoretical burden of
proof on bad faith (unarticulated to the jury) into an actual presumption of the buyer's bad faith
(articulated post-trial).” (At 1343). He would have reversed and remanded because Empire had
not met the burden of proving bad faith, or, alternatively, because, if an unreasonably
disproportionate reduction in requirements creates a presumption of bad faith to be rebutted by
buyer’s proof of good faith, this was not the rule under which the trial was conducted.
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“American Bakeries objects violently to the assumption made by Empire Gas's expert
witness that the vehicles converted by American Bakeries, had it honored what Empire Gas
contends were its obligations under the contract, would have run 100 percent on propane. The
conversion units would have been dual units, which permit the driver by a flick of a switch in the
engine to run his vehicle on either gasoline or propane. But since the parties agree that the price
of propane was lower than that of gasoline throughout the entire contract period, a driver would
have switched his conversion unit to gasoline only when he was low on propane and too far away
from a propane station to reach it before he ran out. This factor was not big enough to upset the
expert witness's calculations significantly.” (At 1341-1342)
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determined propane requirements, but the long-term expected costs of the alternative fuels. If, in
time, American learned that the future price of propane was expected to be relatively high, then
the requirements contract would give it the flexibility to adapt to the new information by
discontinuing installation of the conversion units. The seller could have constrained the buyer’s
discretion by, in effect, imposing a cost if buyer were to reduce its purchases. It could have done
so by providing for a specific minimum, or an installation schedule, or a flat payment to be offset
against future purchases. American had, recall, rejected Empire’s initial proposal which would
have required installation of a minimum number of units.129 The parties’ failure to include
protection of Empire’s reliance in their agreement was no accident; it reflected the low value of
that protection.
If, because of a shift in relative prices, American concluded that it would no longer be
profitable to purchase additional conversion units, then it could cut back or eliminate its
requirements. That is the efficient response and, unless an aggressive definition of good faith
were interposed, that would be the outcome. The point is twofold. The parties could have
explicitly limited the buyer’s discretion to adapt to changed circumstances, but chose not to.
Further, it is doubtful that the courts, using an open-ended standard like good faith, could provide
a default rule better than the zero-protection rule—if the contract is silent, the seller imposes no
fee to protect its reliance and the buyer has absolute discretion to cut back or eliminate
requirements.
There was no evidence that relative prices had changed; indeed, Judge Posner noted that
propane prices stayed below those of gasoline for the entire period.130 The facts are unclear, but
the only changed circumstances appear to be either that American’s financial condition
deteriorated or that it simply got cold feet. Posner’s opinion holds that cold feet are not enough,
although the relative price change most likely would have been. In that sense, his interpretation is
far more respective of the contract language than the Feld or Wigand courts. But that does
present a puzzle. Why would the seller be willing to bear the risk of relative price changes, but
not the lesser risk of the buyer changing his mind?
Unlike most of the other contracts discussed in this paper, the underlying business sense of
the contract is not clear. American did not enter into this agreement to assure a supply of
conversion units. The units were produced by a number of suppliers with Empire only an
intermediary. It could easily have found such units on the open market. That part of the
agreement was most likely ancillary to the fuel requirements contract. It is not obvious why
American would want to take all its fuel requirements from Empire.131 Perhaps it was desperate
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to line up any fuel sources in that era of shortages and rationing; perhaps it would have been
vulnerable to short-term inventory fluctuations and it was buying assurance of a continuous
supply of propane. On this Judge Posner is silent. Indeed, his only invocation of reliance is with
regard to the seller’s reliance on the estimated requirements.132 Given that Empire sold propane
to a large number of accounts, its reliance on any particular one was likely trivial; its failure to
protect its reliance in the contract is consistent with this.
The lost profits remedy provided a ludicrously high level of protection for Empire’s
reliance. The damages are the markups on commodities that Empire bought and sold in
competitive markets. Empire stocked and resold conversion units made by others. The contract
was for sale of a commodity, propane, at roughly the market price (given the meeting competition
clause). The jury found, in effect, that American agreed to pay for 30% of the estimated 3,000
conversion units whether it took them or not. That outcome, as Judge Posner observed, was due
at least in part to American’s litigation strategy. American attacked Empire’s damage estimates
but did not present its own. “American Bakeries gambled . . . [;] we will not relieve it of the
consequences of its risky strategy.” 133 The court was unwilling to use the damage assessment to
make any inferences about the plausible contract structure. The seller could not have wanted
nearly so much protection of its reliance.134
Ironically, in an earlier decision, Lake River Corporation v. Carborundum Company,135
Judge Posner held a minimum guarantee clause to be an unenforceable penalty although the
penalty was no worse than the one imposed by the Empire Gas jury. Lake River had installed a
bagging system for $89,000, in reliance on the contract; had the buyer breached immediately, it
would have owed $533,000, which Posner found an unreasonably high penalty. In Empire Gas,
Empire’s reliance expenditures were $0 and the damages in the millions thanks to the “lost
profits” formulation. Illinois law might well require both outcomes; I think one could come to the
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opposite (and preferable) result under existing law,136 but it would certainly require fewer
contortions if the Code were revised to deal with the problems cleanly.
I will conclude this Section with one more illustration of the importance of proper
framing. In Indiana-American Water Company, Inc. v. Town of Seelyville,137 the court held that a
buyer under a requirements contract to take up to one million gallons per day of water for 25
years from the water company did not breach the agreement when, fifteen years into the contract,
it decided to develop a wellfield that it already owned to meet part of its water demands, thereby
eliminating its requirements. It distinguished an earlier decision138 in which a golf course which
had agreed to buy water under a requirements contract was held to have breached that contract by
purchasing a wellfield in order to obtain its own supply of water. On what ground was it
distinguished? The buyer in the present case had owned the (undeveloped) wellfield for many
years before the present contract was executed; it had not purchased or otherwise acquired its
wellfield during the term of the contract. Purchasing and developing a wellfield after the contract
was entered into is “bad faith,” but developing a wellfield already owned is “good faith.” It is
easy to imagine contract language that would have preserved the buyer’s option to develop its
own property; it is even conceivable that parol evidence would indicate that the water company
was aware of the buyer’s ownership of the field. It is even plausible that the contract was
designed to protect the buyer’s reliance, since the water company likely had a portfolio of
customers and the buyer a dearth of alternative suppliers of water. The blinders of faith, good or
otherwise, led the court to hinge the decision on an irrelevancy and obscured the questions that
ultimately mattered.
V. Large Quantity Increases in Long-Term Contracts
The notion that one party might take undue advantage of a favorable market-contract
price differential in a requirements or output contract is at the core of the Code’s concern about
unreasonably disproportionate demands.139 In long-term contracts, the parties generally include
boundaries on the quantity-determining party’s discretion, boundaries which are sometimes
disregarded by courts invoking good faith. In this Section, I will first discuss four cases in which
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the court pared back the buyer’s requirements. I conclude with an analysis of a case in which the
court found for a seller in an output contract despite a huge increase in output.
In Utah International, Inc. v. Colorado-Ute Electric Association, Inc140 the seller
desperately wanted out of a bad contract. In April 1973, after three years of negotiation, the
parties entered into a 35-year coal supply contract. Seller agreed to provide the coal requirements
for two new generating units, each with a capacity of 350,000 kilowatts. The court did not say,
but it appears that the contract required that the seller develop a new mine. The buyer’s
discretion was limited in two ways. First, the seller’s total obligation over the 35 years was
limited to 1830 trillion Btu’s. Second, the buyer’s annual obligation was to pay for 85% of the
expected coal consumption of the two generators, regardless of whether it actually took the coal.
The contract included a schedule of expected consumption for the entire period. That is, the
contract appears to have been a take-or-pay contract with an annual maximum set by the buyer’s
requirements and a total maximum amount for the 35 year period. There is no mention in the
decision of any other restrictions (e.g., makeups) on the timing of the buyer’s taking of the 1830
trillion Btu’s. The oil price shock of 1973 caused coal prices to go up well beyond the contract
rate and, as in many other fuel disputes of the era, the seller wanted to either renegotiate or
abrogate the contract. The buyer, it claimed, had ordered generators with a capacity of 410,000
kilowatts without informing the seller. The size, it contended, was an essential condition of the
contract and by building units of this size the buyer had abrogated the contract.
The court had no difficulty in finding that the contract should be enforced. More
problematic was the integration of the quantity terms. Colorado-Ute’s construction of larger
generators was, the court ruled, a breach of the contract, but that did not require a forfeiture.141
The buyer was required to pay for the first 85% of its estimated coal consumption (the minimum
annual amount) regardless of whether or not it could use the coal at the new generators. What if
it needed less? The court held that it could (but was not obliged to) take coal below the minimum
quantity and resell that coal on the open market. What if it needed more? The court split the
baby. The court simply eliminated the requirements element. The seller had no obligation to sell
coal beyond the minimum annual amount. If it did so, the sale would be pursuant to a new
agreement, with terms, including price, to be negotiated. Given the huge post-1973 increase in
coal prices, that was a significant victory for the seller.
The court did not reproduce the contract language which is unfortunate, since there seems
to be a conflict between the stated capacity of the two generating plants and the total quantity.
The contract specified the estimated sales for each of the 35 years. That sum was only about 80%
of the maximum obligation (the 1830 trillion Btu’s). If the larger generators were used with the
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same rate of capacity utilization that was used in determining the annual estimates, the 1830
trillion BTU ceiling would not have been reached. It is reasonable to assume that if the smaller
generators had been operated at capacity, they would have bumped into the 1830 trillion Btu
ceiling before the end of the 35 years; otherwise the ceiling would have been completely
irrelevant. The only effect of installing the larger generators, therefore, would be a change in the
timing of the buyer’s requirements so that the contract maximum could be reached sooner. (If
they could not have reached that ceiling with the smaller generators, then one would be hardpressed to explain why the parties included two apparently inconsistent terms in the agreement.)
Given the huge increase in coal prices, the change in timing mattered to the parties, ex post. But,
ex ante, when they entered into the contract and when Colorado-Ute changed the size of the
generators (pre-oil shock), the change in timing was likely unimportant; prices could as easily
have fallen (as they did in the 1980's).
The seller had agreed to make enough coal available to produce 1830 trillion Btu’s over
35 years, and to be paid for about 2/3 of it, even if the buyer decided to take none. At most, the
generator size placed limits on the timing. If the capacity of the two units was indeed a term of
the contract, then the ceiling on the buyer’s annual requirements would be defined thereby. The
buyer should not be allowed to insist upon delivery of coal beyond the capacity of the smaller
units. That, rather than the court’s baby-splitting, would have been the resolution consistent with
the terms of the agreement.
Assuming, as we must, that the smaller generators had sufficient capacity to yield the 1830
trillion Btu maximum within the 35 year time frame, we can calculate backward to determine
Colorado-Ute’s maximum annual requirements for running those generators. (This gives only an
approximation–had the court understood the case better, it could have obtained a more precise
figure.) That would set a ceiling for the seller’s annual responsibility. A little fiddling with the
numbers yields a maximum take about 50% greater than the contractually defined minimum take,
the precise number depending on how much the potential output of the smaller generators would
have exceeded the 1830 Btu ceiling over the life of the agreement.142 While the seller’s maximum
annual obligation was not so well-defined as the minimum annual take, it was certainly
ascertainable by reference to the plant’s capacity; and the seller’s total obligation over the 35
years was precisely defined. The court just chose to disregard this in rewriting the deal. Perhaps
142
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the court’s paring back of the seller’s obligation was an informal attempt to share the wealth. The
court did not explicitly take the price history of coal into account, but the outcome might reflect
its discomfort with the buyer receiving so large a share of the windfall, especially when it
apparently behaved in a less than exemplary manner.143
In both City of Lakeland, Florida, v. Union Oil Company of California144 and Orange
and Rockland Utilities, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corporation145 the purchaser of fuel oil
substantially increased its requirements following an increase in the market price. The increased
requirements were due both to substitution of oil for gas and increased wholesale sales. In both
instances the courts disallowed the full increase, although the courts differed in their treatment of
the two. In each case the buyer’s requirements were limited by the capacity of its plant and the
court held, implicitly, that good faith required that the buyer run its plant at below full capacity.146
The City of Lakeland, Florida owned power plants that could be fired by burning either
natural gas, Bunker “C” oil, or a mixture of the two. It entered into a ten-year contract for the
primary fuel, natural gas, in 1960. That contract, not at issue here, specified a minimum amount
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of gas the City must take. However, it also gave the City a right to terminate if Bunker “C” oil
became available at a more favorable price which the gas company refused to match. The fuels
were interchangeable, but they differed in their method of delivery. Oil is transported by carrier
and stored in on-site tanks; gas is received from transmission lines with no on-site storage.
Difficulties in transmission or increased consumption might result in interruption of gas supply,
particularly in cold weather.
In 1968 the City entered into a contract with Union Oil for provision of Bunker “C” as a
stand-by or alternate fuel. The contract price was $2.28 or the going market price plus specified
transportation costs (which at the time of first delivery was $2.16) whichever was smaller. It was
a five-year contract with Lakeland having the option to terminate every year. If the supply of
natural gas were interrupted, the City could take all its fuel requirements from Union Oil.
Moreover, if the contract price of oil fell below that of natural gas, the buyer could take 100% of
its fuel requirements from Union Oil.
In the first three years, the share of oil increased from 20% to 40% to 56%. In the third
year, in May 1970, the City entered into a new gas contract which set a fixed price for gas of 3.3¢
per therm (equivalent to about $2.08 per barrel of oil) plus an escalation factor based on the
market price of oil. So long as the market price of oil was less than $2.47, gas remained the
cheaper fuel. Rising oil prices in late 1970 brought the adjusted gas price above that and the City
shifted a substantial amount of its purchases to oil. When the City notified Union in June 1971
that it elected to continue the agreement for the fourth year, Union responded that it would no
longer be willing to sell at the contract price. The City sued for injunctive relief and damages.
Union Oil argued that the agreement was not valid because the City’s promise was
illusory. Natural gas and oil are, Union argued, the same commodity, so the City was at liberty to
buy the same commodity from others (the gas company) if it so desired.
There can be no doubt, under the literal terms of the contract . . . that the City is
free to purchase as much or as little Bunker "C" oil as it may want from Union,
i.e., "capriciously desire." Hence, the prime question is whether the City is also at
liberty to purchase the same article or commodity from other suppliers as well.
Union insists that it is, arguing that gas and oil are "apples and apples," that both
are fuels subject to interchangeable or even simultaneous use. As a result, since the
agreement also permits the City to purchase natural gas in any amount it desires,
Union would conclude that the contract contains no promise at all sufficient to
supply a valid consideration.147
The court dismissed this argument noting that the agreement “expressly contemplated the
possibility of a conversion from gas to oil as the primary fuel,” and denying that interchangeability
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rendered gas and oil the same commodity.148 Because oil was a different commodity, if the City
elected to take any oil at all, it was bound to take it from Union. That was sufficient to dispel the
illusory nature of the promise and permit the court to find consideration.
That reasoning suggests that, had both contracts been for oil, the court would have found
for Union. The promise was given substance, the court reasoned, not by good faith, but by the
exclusivity—if the buyer chose to take oil, it could only take from Union Oil. Suppose, however,
that both suppliers were supplying Bunker “C” oil. Union Oil had granted the buyer a zero-price
option to take any quantity of oil up to a maximum (set by the buyer’s capacity) at a contractually
determined price. The buyer received assurance of supply continuity and an option to take fuel at
the lower net price; the contract price and the seller’s expected sales were high enough to make
the deal appear attractive to the seller, as indeed it was for most of the first three years of the
agreement. The benefit to both parties should provide the consideration, not the exclusivity.149
Union Oil also argued that if this were a valid contract, the City had abused its discretion
by increasing its purchases in a matter not contemplated by the parties. It had converted fuel oil
from a standby fuel to the primary fuel and had increased its overall demand for fuel oil by
increasing its wholesale sales to Tampa Electric, a public utility. The court dismissed the former
argument, noting that the contract was quite specific in allowing the buyer to do so. It accepted
the latter, however, pointing out that initial sales to Tampa had been less than one per cent of
electricity production, but that they had grown to over 13% by 1971.
The simple fact is that Union entered into an agreement which later proved to be
improvident, from its point of view, when the market price of oil advanced to
unforeseen heights. The City, on the other hand, realized a concomitant advantage;
and that is precisely what the business and the law of contracts is all about. This is
not to say, however, that the City may add insult to injury by taking undue
advantage of its favorable contract and increase its wholesale exchange of energy
with a neighboring system. Such increases must be regarded as beyond the
contemplation of the parties and the scope of the contract, and must be taken into
account as a limiting factor in determining the damages to be awarded to the
City.150
The only contractual limit on Lakeland’s requirements was its generating capacity, known
to both parties at the time of contracting. If Lakeland had shifted to using fuel oil for 100% of its
needs that would have been acceptable, according to the court. Apparently, Lakeland’s capacity
had not been fully utilized. The court appears to conclude that the existing level of
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underutilization was an implied term in the contract; increased utilization in response to the
favorable price somehow “added insult to injury.” The court provides no hint as to why, in the
absence of any explicit language, the requirements should be bounded by the existing level of
capacity utilization rather than the more natural actual generating capacity.
Amerada Hess is oft-cited as an example of a buyer unreasonably expanding its
requirements in response to an increase in the market price. Properly framed, this is an easy case
which the court bungled (with the approval of most commentators).151 The parties entered into a
ten-year contract in December 1969 in which Amerada Hess agreed to supply O&R's
requirements for fuel oil No. 6 for its Lovett generating plant in Tompkin's Cove, New York.152
The contract required Hess to lease a parcel of land from O&R and erect storage facilities to
which it would deliver the fuel oil. The price for the first five years was $2.14 per barrel, subject
to escalation for cost-related factors.153 The quantity clause specified estimated annual sales for
the five years. It was expected that the primary fuel at the plant would be gas; projections were
for gas to account for about 60% of the BTU's generated by the plant. However, the contract
stated: "[nothing] herein shall preclude the use by Buyer of . . . natural gas in such quantities as
may be or become available."154
Five months after the contract was signed, the price of fuel oil began to rise. By March of
1971 it had more than doubled. O&R increased its fuel oil requirements by over 60% in 1970 and
continued to order quantities that were more than double the contractual estimates. In April,
1971, Hess unilaterally attempted to raise the price by 97.7 cents per barrel and threatened to
terminate deliveries if O&R declined. O&R obtained a preliminary injunction enjoining Hess from
ceasing delivery of the fuel oil.155 Apparently, this did not prevent Hess from limiting its sales to
the contract estimates. O&R purchased additional fuel oil at the market price and sued Hess for
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the difference for fuel oil purchased through September 1973.156 Its complaint was dismissed by
the trial court and that dismissal was affirmed by Appellate Division. O&R's requirements, said
both courts, were not incurred in good faith. They were, as a matter of law, unreasonably
disproportionate.
O&R could not (and did not) take oil under the contract and resell it at the higher market
price. It could only demand fuel oil to supply the needs of the Lovett plant. Its requirements
increased over the estimated needs for two reasons. First, it increased its sales to the New York
Power Pool, in effect sharing with other utilities the benefits of its below-market price. Second, it
substituted oil for gas at the Lovett plant.
The former factor is tantamount to making the other utilities in the state silent
partners to the contract, . . . while the latter factor amounts to a unilateral and
arbitrary change in the conditions prevailing at the time of the contract so as to
take advantage of market conditions at the seller's expense. . . . Hess was therefore
justified in 1970 in refusing to meet plaintiff's demands, by reason of the fact that
plaintiff's "requirements" were not incurred in good faith.157
Again, the court uses “good faith” to impose a quantity ceiling short of the plant’s
capacity. The contract placed a clear limit on O&R's maximum demand—the capacity of the
Lovett generating plant. It should surprise no one in the industry that if the relative prices of oil
and gas change, the buyer would react in the appropriate manner. Nor was the existence of the
New York Power Pool a deep secret. O&R's requirements depended only in part on the electricity
demand of their direct customers. The contract gave O&R flexibility both in its choice of fuel and
its dealings with the power pool. If Hess wanted to place tighter limits on O&R's discretion it
would have been easy to do so, either by including a quantity maximum short of the plant's
capacity or by tying its supply obligation to the market price. To be sure, Hess did not anticipate
the price increase in 1970 (let alone the much larger increase after October 1973), but that risk
was allocated to Hess in the contract. By interposing the "unreasonably disproportionate"
standard, the courts deprived O&R of the flexibility it had bargained for, converting the contract
into a (nearly) fixed quantity contract. As in Lakeland, the court implicitly ruled that the seller
had promised to run its plant at less than full capacity for the life of the agreement, never asking
why on earth a party would make such an odd promise.
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In neither Lakeland nor Amerada Hess did the seller increase its requirements by
expanding its plant. Nor, under the contracts, could they.158 The physical limits of the plant were
the only constraints on their discretion. The contracts could have imposed further limits on
interfuel substitution, sales to non-end users (Tampa Electric and the New York Power Pool), or
on total sales. Or they could have set price as a function of annual power sales (perhaps allowing
for renegotiation of the price for all sales above a certain level.) Apparently, they felt these
additional constraints unnecessary; in fact, the Lakeland contract explicitly rejected limits on
interfuel substitution. In both instances the court rewrote the contract placing additional
constraints on the seller's discretion.159
A much earlier case, Loudenback Fertilizer Co. v. Tennessee Phosphate Co.,160 posed a
slight variation on these cases. Loudenback entered into a five-year requirements contract to
purchase rocks in order to make fertilizer, with a 3,000 ton annual maximum. In the first two
years it ordered none; after a doubling of the market price of rocks in the third year it ordered
3,000 tons which the seller refused to deliver. The court sustained the seller’s demurrer, saying
that the buyer’s failure to take any rocks in the first two years was a breach of the agreement.
Burton and Andersen argue that the court’s decision in favor of seller was based on buyer’s
opportunistic demand for the maximum, not it’s failure to take in the first two years.161
Why did the buyer take no rocks in the first two years? The rocks were an input into an
intermediate product, namely acidulated rocks. In the first two years it was cheaper to buy
acidulated rocks directly rather than to make by combining seller’s rocks with sulphuric acid,
because, the buyer claimed, there had been a large increase in the price of sulphuric acid. In the
third year, however, with acidulated rock prices up and sulphuric acid prices down, it was cheaper
to make. In both Lakeland and Hess the increased quantity demand was in response to a fall in
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the relative price vis a vis a substitute. In Loudenback, it was in response to a fall in the relative
cost of a product produced internally versus that same product already “assembled.” Perhaps the
parties did not mean to give the buyer the discretion to respond to such price changes. Or
perhaps one could argue that the requirements contract covered both the raw material and the
assembled product (although the court does not come close to saying that). The minimal
statement of the facts gives no indication of why either party would want a multi-year contract,
nor why the quantity discretion was given to the buyer. Absent any facts, the most natural
interpretation would seem to be that the buyer agreed to buy between zero and 3,000 tons per
year with the actual quantity depending on the overall demand for its fertilizer and the relative
costs of make versus buy. Rather than sustaining seller’s demurrer, the court should have granted
summary judgment to the buyer (perhaps leaving the window open for some narrow defenses).
In The Lenape Resources Corporation v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company,162 a closely
divided court upheld a buyer’s claim despite a huge increase in the quantity it demanded. The
dispute involved a long-term take-or-pay contract—the Gas Purchase Agreement (GPA)—
entered into in 1979. It was typical of contracts entered into at that time by pipelines in general
and Tennessee in particular in both the length and the commitment to a high take-or-pay option.
It did have one unusual feature, as we shall soon see. Market conditions changed dramatically
shortly afterward leading to industry wide renegotiation and litigation. One court noted:
In the 1980s, . . . conflicting forces increased the gas supply, yet decreased
demand, thereby leading to a sharp decline in sales and market price. Thus,
pursuant to their long term take-or-pay contracts, pipelines were required to buy
gas at a cost significantly above the market price at which they could later sell it.
Confronted with the prospect of bankruptcy, many pipelines refused to either take
or pay for gas, despite their contractual commitments. Producers recognized that
instability among the pipelines would ultimately be detrimental to their own
interests by causing massive dislocation within the industry. Resultingly, most
pipelines and producers agreed to reform their contracts and settle their
disputes.163
In 1983 and again in 1985-1986 Tennessee informed its producers that it would refuse to
honor its take-or-pay obligations. Not all the producers caved in graciously. Settlements of some
of Tennessee's litigation are described in Mandell v. Hamman Oil & Refining Co.164 and
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Williamson v. Elf Aquitaine, Inc..165 Lenape did acquiesce initially,166 but in response to a 1989
suit against it by its lessors for breach of the implied covenant to develop its leases, Lenape
developed new wells, dramatically increasing its production, thereby precipitating this litigation.
The GPA reflected Tennessee's weak bargaining position in 1979.167 It agreed to take, on
a take-or-pay basis, 85% of Lenape's delivery capacity (defined as the amount of gas that could
efficiently be withdrawn from the wells) of the defined gas reserves in a particular field. The
decision as to the development of the fields was left exclusively in Lenape's hands. The contract
specifically reserved the seller’s right
[t]o operate its property free from any control by Buyer in such a manner as
Seller, in its sole discretion, may deem advisable, including without limitation, the
right, but never the obligation, to drill new wells, to repair and rework old wells,
and to plug any well or surrender any lease or portion thereof . . . .168
Production in the first twelve years was modest, with annual payments never exceeding $300,000.
Following the development of the new wells, there was a huge increase in production. In 1993
Tennessee paid, under protest, $89 million. It sought a declaratory judgment that the increased
production was in bad faith and unreasonably disproportionate to prior production. Alternatively,
it argued that if the contract were not governed by §2-306, then the agreement was void and
unenforceable for lack of mutuality.
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The trial court’s decision for Lenape was reversed by the Court of Appeals; that decision,
in turn, was reversed by the Texas Supreme Court in a 5-4 vote. There was considerable
disagreement as to whether the GPA was an output contract subject to §2-306. The majority’s
ostensible ground for concluding that it was outside §2-306 was that the Section applies “only
when a contract does not unambiguously specify the quantity of the output of the seller or the
requirements of the buyer.”169 This, however, fails to distinguish the GPA from other carefully
crafted agreements delineating the limits of the quantity-determining party’s discretion. More to
the point, the majority noted that §2-306 is a gap filler and the contract language clearly filled the
gap.170 The real question should have been whether the clear language of the GPA could be
trumped by the imposition of a fact finder’s notion of good faith.
It is illuminating to compare the differing views of what a good faith test would entail.
The majority catalogued the difficulties:
Instead of defining Tennessee's take-or-pay obligations in terms of a fixed
percentage of Sellers' delivery capacity, Tennessee would have us read the GPA as
requiring Tennessee to purchase only a portion of gas that may be tendered as
reasonably proportionate to any normal or otherwise comparable prior output. The
quantity of gas which Tennessee must either take or pay for would depend on a
number of indeterminate variables: prior output; normal prior output; comparable
prior output; proportionality to either normal or comparable prior output; and
reasonableness of the proportionality. Reading these factors into Tennessee's takeor-pay obligations, any increase in production and delivery capacity would be
measured after the fact by these variables, thus injecting uncertainty into the
parties' obligations under the GPA.171
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According to the dissent, “The basic test for good faith here is whether and to what extent
the Sellers would have increased the quantity of gas proffered had the contract price equaled the
market price, i.e., was there a valid business reason for the increased quantity independent of
price?”172 That is, the seller enters into a long-term agreement giving it complete flexibility to
develop its business in response to all new circumstances save the inability of the contract price to
track market conditions. It is hard to understand why that should be a mandatory rule, especially
since there are so many devices available for linking the contract and market price.173 The dissent
goes on to link the “unreasonable disproportion” standard to the parties’ expectations at the time
of contracting:
But whether the magnitude of the disproportion here is unreasonable under section
2.306 depends on the expectations of the parties when the contract was executed
and whether such an increase in output could have been reasonably forecast or
anticipated. Orange and Rockland, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 822. Objective indicia of the
parties' reasonable expectations at that time may also be considered, including the
size and capabilities of the pipe lines and other facilities, the history of the area, the
nature of the formation, local industry practices, reserve and deliverability
estimates and so forth.174
The evidence on expectations and trade practice would be confined to conditions in 1979
at the time of contract execution. There is no question that when the contract was executed
Tennessee was not concerned about the possibility that Lenape would have too much delivery
capacity. Tennessee might not have anticipated an expansion of this magnitude, but it surely
hoped for one. It was scrambling for gas sources and the more the merrier. Granting Lenape
complete discretion in this dimension seemed costless at the time. That turned out to be a big
mistake. But that mutual misjudgment should not empower the court to rewrite the contract.
Tennessee compounded its mistake by failing to renegotiate limits on Lenape’s discretion
in the six-year window before the suit by Lenape’s lessors forced it to expand its capacity.
Lenape did not take full advantage of its windfall for years and it would not have been very
expensive for Tennessee to buy its way out. It chose not to do so, and as a result the price of a
buyout rose dramatically. It is conceivable that had the parties engineered a buyout, Lenape could
still have been sued successfully by its lessors for its failure to develop the leases. If so, it, not
Tennessee, would have been the big loser.
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Lenape’s relationship with its lessors was likely the proximate cause of the huge expansion
of delivery capacity. However, that should not matter. Suppose that Lenape owned the
properties outright. When the gas market collapsed, the contract gave Lenape a valuable right. It
could threaten to develop a gas field for which it was assured above-market prices. If the market
conditions did not warrant the development, this was at least a threat point in its dealings with
Tennessee. Lenape’s taking a hard line might be less appealing than if it could say credibly “the
lessors made me do it.” Still, there is no reason for the courts to take sides in the renegotiation
between two sophisticated hard-nosed bargainers.
In Lenape, the seller of gas dramatically increased its output. Northern Natural Gas Co.
v. Conoco, Inc.,175 presented an interesting twist. Northern, a pipeline, had contracts to purchase
natural gas from a number of suppliers of natural gas and a contract to supply all of that gas to
Conoco.176 However, after the deregulation of the gas market Northern managed to buy itself out
of all its contracts to buy gas so that its gas purchases and sales dropped from 3 billion cubic feet
per day in the mid-1980s to zero in 1994. Hence, it had no gas under contract and, therefore, had
no obligation to deliver to Conoco. Conoco sued, arguing that Northern could not avoid its
obligation by canceling contracts with its suppliers and a jury awarded it $20 million for lost
processing profits. That result was overturned, however, with the court finding that the contract
did not require that Northern buy any gas and, therefore, that it had no obligation to deliver any
gas to Conoco. Still, Conoco won half a loaf, with a unanimous supreme court remanding on the
question of whether Northern’s cancellation of its contracts was in good faith.
Nothing requires the seller in an output contract to have any output, and nothing
requires the buyer in a requirements contract to have requirements. On the other
hand, parties to output/requirements contracts are required to exercise good faith
in determining outputs or requirements, as well as accept the concomitant risk that
their counterparts to the contract may make good faith variations, even to the
extent of liquidating or discontinuing the business. . . . We agree with Conoco that
a party who seeks to avoid performance of an output contract by having no
output–or of a requirements contract by having no requirements–may not do so in
bad faith. Accordingly, we affirm the court of appeals' judgment remanding this
cause for a new trial for Conoco to attempt to prove that Northern canceled its gas
purchase contracts without a valid business reason and in bad faith.177
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The Lenape majority’s skepticism about defining a good faith response to the dramatic
changes in the natural gas market seems to have evaporated in the three years between the two
decisions. If Northern’s closing out its unprofitable contracts with suppliers was a valid business
reason for having no gas to deliver to Conoco, as the court held, what could be bad faith? That,
apparently, is a jury question, although there is no hint as to how a juror could possibly answer
the question.
VI. Conclusion
One might object to the preceding discussion by invoking the circularity problem. The
backdrop against which these contracts were written, either the common law or the Code,
included “good faith.” If the parties drafted their agreements against that backdrop, then, it could
be argued, they have incorporated the present understanding of the law into the contract. If the
parties expected courts to apply the Code’s good faith standard, then a failure to do so would
amount to a rewriting of the agreement. Putting a “rational expectations” spin on things, when
they entered into the agreement, the parties could have anticipated what the courts ultimately did.
The implied limitation, the argument goes, was part of the deal. Without a theoretical framework
there is no particular reason to prefer one interpretation to another. The theoretical framework
proposed here allows us to break the circle and to reject the notion that the parties intended to
incorporate the Code’s good faith standard.
The relevant theory is hardly esoteric. The core notion is that in long-term agreements,
adaptation to changed circumstances is often best achieved by granting to one party considerable
discretion in determining quantity. The discretion will not be unbounded; the contracts will
typically relate the quantity to a physical constraint, like the capacity of a particular plant of the
buyer or seller. Moreover, the contracts will often go further than that. If the opposite party is
vulnerable to quantity variation, it will want to convey the contours of its reliance by, in effect,
confronting the decision maker with a price reflecting the extent of its reliance.
In some instances, like the Great Lakes Carbon (GLC) petroleum coke contracts,178 the
contract allows the seller to operate the plant at any level at all without taking into account any
adverse effects on the counterparty. This is not an accident, since GLC's ability to hold a large
inventory meant that its reliance costs would be very low. Similarly, Propane International
provided General Motors the flexibility to put together a web of agreements to assure a low-cost
supply of standby gas, giving it an option to take gas at a price above the market price at the time
of contracting.179 PI's reliance was nil. It agreed to stand ready to deliver gas at the premium
price (although that premium price turned out to be well below the market price), and if GM did
not need the gas, PI would simply hold it in inventory. Likewise, Levy relied on Feld to remove
the day-old bread, but Feld, who apparently was selling bread crumbs long before Levy bought his
toaster oven, did not need a promise that Levy would continue to produce bread crumbs; Levy's
178
179

See Section I.
See text at note 43.
-59-

self-interest (it had bought a toaster oven that appeared to have no other economic use) provided
sufficient protection of Feld's reliance. The buyer's reliance in Wigand and Diamond Alkali was
considerably greater than in Levy, since the buyer owned capital assets the value of which
depended crucially on the continued operation of the plant. In both instances, the buyer's
protection was the penalty (lost revenue) that the seller would incur from closing an otherwise
viable facility—an entire factory, rather than a mere toaster oven.
The other guy's self-interest is not always enough. The preceding discussion has provided
numerous examples of devices that constrain the exercise of discretion. For one, by incorporating
flexible pricing, the contracts could decrease the rewards to opportunistic behavior by the
quantity-determining party. Eastern’s incentive to engage in fuel freighting, for example, would
normally have been constrained by tying the contract price to current market conditions; however,
the breakdown of the price adjustment mechanism meant that in this instance the constraint
failed.180 The meeting competition clause in the Empire Gas contract is another example.181
Two-part pricing is another example. If the per unit price for small quantities is high,
then, so long as the buyer is likely to require an amount above that minimum, the seller will have
some assurance that it will receive enough compensation to make its initial investment worth
while. This device was common in the petroleum coke contracts of the aluminum companies.182
General Motors also used two-part pricing with Enterprise, its primary propane supplier.
Alternatively, the seller could be required to make a fixed payment. Two-part pricing
would mean that if the buyer’s demand fell off dramatically, the seller could end up bearing all the
risk. The seller might insist upon more assurance so that even if the buyer took nothing, the seller
would still receive some compensation. There are numerous devices for reaching this outcome:
take-or-pay, minimum quantity, standby charges, or liquidated damages (and variations on these)
all set the marginal price at zero for low quantities. The options considered in the NIPSCO-CWI
negotiations, as described above, indicate the range of choices and the ability of serious
commercial parties to tailor them to their own needs.183
The tailoring need not always be wise, either ex ante or ex post. But the important point
is that the parties have an incentive to take their reliance interest into account, and, since
protecting reliance can be costly, they have a further incentive to economize by not insisting upon
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too much protection. There is no reason to believe that a court, using a theoretically ungrounded
good faith standard, could do better.
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